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Searching the Clouds 
Until law enforcement routinely recognizes the Fourth 
Amendment protects the cloud network, an additional added 
protection is to continue to allow magistrates to impose restrictions 
on computer warrants. Magistrates can do this by strictly enforcing 
the particularity requirement and by placing strict parameters on 
computer warrants. If a magistrate grants a warrant for a computer 
hard drive, he should specifically note that the search cannot expand 
onto the cloud. Then, if the agent oversteps his bounds, the defense 
may use the warrant's imposed limitations to suppress any data seized 
unlawfully from the cloud. Restrictions 'Such as limiting the search 
parameters to the physical hard drive, requiring searches to be 
conducted on copies of the hard drive instead of the actual computer, 
or requiring that search of the computer takes place off-line223 will 
prevent law enforcement from even "accidently" exceeding the bounds 
of the warrant. If magistrates clearly and consistently apply 
restrictions to computer search warrants and suppress unlawfully 
seized evidence from the cloud, law enforcement will get the message: 
if they want to go beyond the physical hard drive, they must obtain a 
separate warrant. 
These additional steps will not interfere with law enforcement's 
ability to continue to perform effective searches and seizures. Users of 
the cloud network have not given up their expectation of privacy 
simply because they choose to use the best means of data storage 
available. When the user has not shared the documents through a 
network beyond one he has created for himself, he has not exposed 
the documents to the public and maintains his reasonable expectation 
of privacy. The law must recognize this and must be willing to 
develop criteria for the expectation of privacy to meet the demands of 
the evolving technological world. 
223. In some cases, data saved in a cloud network account is not accessible 
from a device that is off-line. 
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SAVING THE SPOTIFY REVOLUTION: 
RECALIBRATING THE POWER 
IMBALANCE IN DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 
E. Jordan Teague1 
ABSTRACT 
Many believed that Spotify would revolutionize the music 
industry, offering a legal alternative to file sharing that compensates 
musicians for use of their digital music. Why, then, have artists been 
abandoning the Spotify revolution in droves? Because the revolution 
has a dark side. Since Spotify is partly-owned by major record labels, 
it has a serious conflict of interest with independent artists. Spotify's 
lack of transparency about its financial flows gives musicians further 
reason to question whether the service has their interests in mind, 
particularly in light of the microscopic royalties Spotify has paid 
artists to date. This climate of suspicion has caused many artists to 
abandon the service and pursue alternative means of digital 
distribution and promotion. Even listeners have begun leaving 
Spotify on account of how it treats artists. Ironically, Spotify has 
managed to alienate the very audiences it needs as allies: artists, who 
supply Spotify's "unlimited" song library; and listeners, who fund the 
service through subscriptions and advertising. As such, the Spotify 
revolution is destined to fail-an unfortunate reality, as the streaming 
music business model has great potential to benefit artists and serve 
the under lying goals of copyright. 
I argue that the most effective way to save the Spotify revolution 
is through a compulsory licensing scheme. This is because the 
primary impediment to Spotify changing its treatment of artists is its 
insulation from competitive pressures, which ultimately stems from 
the major labels' formidable bargaining position in digital sound 
recordings. The labels have assumed a gatekeeping function in 
streaming music, demanding corporate equity in exchange for access 
to their so"und recordings, which every streaming service needs to 
build a comprehensive catalog. As a result, the streaming music 
market has very few participants, all of which are partially controlled 
1. Jordan Teague is an associate at Burr & Forman LLP in Birmingham, 
Alabama. She received her J .D. in 2012 from Vanderbilt University 
Law School, where she was the Senior Technology Editor of the 
Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment and Technology Law. Jordan 
received her B.A. magna cum laude in Mathematics-Economics from 
Furman University in 2005. 
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by the major labels. Compulsory licensing would make the major 
labels' sound recordings more readily accessible to would-be streaming 
services. A more competitive marketplace will lead to greater 
transparency and fairer treatment of artists-and will ultimately 
enable the Spotify revolution to succeed. 
INTRODUCTION 
When Spotify reached the U.S. market in mid-2011, 
commentators acclaimed that "the future of music" was here.2 
Finally, legal access to a nearly unlimited catalog of music had 
become possible.3 Although sharing many of the same characteristics 
as its illegal peer-to-peer predecessors like Napster, Spotify claimed to 
have an objective that distinguished it from other file sharing sites: 
compensating artists.4 With potential to be the holy grail of music-
unlimited songs for listeners with a paycheck for artists-Spotify 
seemed to be on track to revolutionize the music industry for 
consumers and musicians. 
Why, then, have independent artists been abandoning this 
revolution in droves? Because the revolution has a dark side. Artists 
began growing suspicious of the service after receiving microscopic 
royalty checks.5 Though artists have urged it to divulge how it 
calculates royalties, Spotify has been far from forthcoming with artists 
about its financial flows, giving artists all the more reason to distrust 
the service. 6 Further cementing this climate of suspicion is the fact 
that the U.S. major record labels partly own the service, meaning that 
the labels, as shareholders, did not necessarily have artists' interests 
in mind during negotiations with Spotify.7 Left in the dark, artists 
must make a seemingly lose-lose choice: stay on Spotify and collect 
miniscule royalties, or leave the service, forgoing Spotify revenue and 
exposure. Many musicians have chosen the latter, abandoning Spotify 
2. Randall Roberts, Critic's Notebook: With Spotify, the Future of Music is 
Here, POP & HISS: THE LA TIMES MUSIC BLOG (Jul. 22, 2011, 5:34 PM), 
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/music_blog/2011/07 /critics-notebook-
with-spotify-the-future-of-music-is-here.html. 
3. Id. ("rUlnlimited access to a huge chunk of the world's recorded music 
library ... has become reality."). 
4. Tom Krazit, @ FB: Highlights from Mark Zuckerberg's Keynote Address, 
PAIDCONTENT (Sept. 22, 2011, 9:51 PM), 
http:/ /paidcontent.org/2011/09 /22/ 419-fS-highlights-from-mark- . 
zuckerbergs-keynote-address/ (noting that Daniel Ek, creator of Spot1fy, 
"[S]tated [his service] 's goal was to help people discover more music 
while fairly compensating artists."). 
5. See infra Part II.A.iii. 
6. See infra Part II.A.ii. 
7. See infra Part II.A.i. 
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and pursuing alternate avenues of spreading their artistry. Even 
listeners have begun leaving Spotify on account of how it treats 
artists. Ironically, Spotify has managed to alienate the very audiences 
it needs as allies: artists, who supply Spotify's "unlimited" song 
library, and listeners, who fund the service through subscriptions and 
advertising. As such, the Spotify revolution is destined to fail; yet 
Spotify. continues to bow to the interests of the major labels. 
While artists may have good reason to be distrustful, the 
technology is not the problem. By reducing distribution costs for 
artists and improving the public's access to creative works, the 
streaming music business model could serve copyright's goals of 
promoting creation and dissemination. 8 Further, Spotify could be a 
viable way for musicians to monetize digital recordings if its user base 
increases through network effects. 9 With promise to benefit artists, 
the Spotify revolution does not need to be stifled-it needs to be 
saved by recalibrating the power imbalance in the digital music 
market. 
This Note argues that the most effective way to save the Spotify 
revolution is to enable a competitive marketplace through compulsory 
licensing. 10 Because of the dangerous combination of the labels' 
market share and their holdout right under copyright law, the major 
labels sit as a formidable gatekeeper of the streaming music market, 
deciding who will enter and on what terms. 11 This has resulted in a 
marketplace consisting of only a handful of key participants, all of 
whom are part-owned by the major labels. 12 I contend that a 
compulsory licensing scheme, similar to those already in place in the 
Copyright Act for other music markets, would dissolve the labels' 
gatekeeping ability, for it would make the labels' catalogs available to 
any potential streaming service.13 Further, it would prevent the labels 
from leveraging copyright ownership into streaming service 
ownership.14 A more competitive marketplace will lead to greater 
transparency and fairer treatment of artists-and will ultimately 
enable the Spotify revolution to succeed~ 
8. See infra Part III.A. 
9. See infra Part III.A. 
10. See infra Part III.C. 
11. See infra Part III.B. 
12. See infra Part III.B. 
13. See infra Part III.C. 
14. See infra Part III.C. 
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artists. Ironically, Spotify has managed to alienate the very audiences 
it needs as allies: artists, who supply Spotify's "unlimited" song 
library, and listeners, who fund the service through subscriptions and 
advertising. As such, the Spotify revolution is destined to fail; yet 
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I. THE SPOTIFY REVOLUTION: STREAMING 
MUSIC AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO FILE SHARING 
A. Napster: An Illegal Means to the Inevitable End of Music Sharing 
Napster, the forerunner of digital music sharing, made its debut 
on June 1, 1999, before the days of Spotify, Pandora, and even 
iTunes.15 Napster's software allowed users around the globe to share 
music libraries with one another. 16 Reaching nearly sixty million users 
and forty million songs within its first year of operation, 17 N apster 
offered a virtually limitless song collection. While Napster wasn't the 
first music sharing service to emerge online, 18 it was the first to gain 
widespread use because of its innovative utilization of peer-to-peer 
technology. 19 Napster's predecessors required users to download entire 
files from a single intermediary;20 in contrast, Napster's peer-to-peer 
client connected users directly during the file transfer process, 
meaning that mp3 files never passed onto Napster's servers. 21 This 
15. Tim Wu, When Code Isn't Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 679, 728 (2003) ("The 
beta version of Napster debuted on June 1, 1999. Napster's 
revolutionary design was a response to the legal and technical problems 
of the web-based companies. As one commentator noted, '[Napster] was 
written to solve a problem-[legal] limitations on file copying."') 
(quoting Clay Shirky, What is P2P ... And What Isn't?, THE 
O'REILLY NETWORKS (Nov. 24, 2000), available at 
http://openp2p.com/pub/a/p2p/2000/11/24/shirkyl-whatisp2p.html). 
16. Nicholas M. Menasche, Note, Recording Industry Missteps: Suing 
Anonymous Filesharers As A Last Resort, 26 PACE L. REV. 273, 280 
(2005) ("Napster, the first filesharing program to receive national 
attention, enabled users to: '(1) make MP3 music available for copying 
by other Napster users; (2) search for MP3 music files stored on other 
users' computers; and (3) transfer exact copies of the contents of other 
users' MP3 files from one computer to another via the Internet.' 
Napster's free MusicShare software and its system of servers enabled 
this process.") (quoting A&M Records, Inc'. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 
1004, 1011 (9th Cir. 2001)). 
17. Id. (noting that Napster's sixty million users were sharing about forty 
million songs by 2000). 
18. Wu, supra note 14 at 727 (describing earlier, more primitive, file-sharing 
solutions that relied on a centralized server). 
19. Menasche, supra note 16 at 280. 
20. See Wu, supra note 15 at 727. 
21. Lital Helman, Note, When Your Recording Agency Turns into an 
Agency Problem: The True Nature of the Peer-to-Peer Debate, 50 IDEA 
49, 68 (2009) ("Napster's technology was the first file-sharing software 
designed for exchanging music files that allowed transfer of such files 
among its users without crossing its server. Napster's site included only 
indexes of the songs that were actually residing on other users' hard 
drives"). 
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feature gave Napster two distinct advantages. First, its file transfer 
process was much faster than that of its rivals, who relied on a 
centralized host to process requests. 22 Second, because N apster itself 
did not process file transfers, it had a colorable argument against 
copyright infringement liability. 23 Consequently, it managed to stay 
afloat for over two years. 
Given that nearly three-quarters of the files exchanged through 
Napster were songs owned by major labels,24 it was not long before 
copyright owners hauled N apster into court for copyright 
infringement.25 Unfortunately for Napster, the Ninth Circuit did not 
agree that its unique features absolved it of copyright infringement 
liability. 26 Unable to sustain in court-ordered system monitoring for 
copyright infringement and unable to persuade the major labels to 
license their repertoire, N apster filed for bankruptcy in 2002. 27 
N apster's demise hardly marked the end to file sharing, though. 
Other services like Aimster and Grokster followed in Napster's 
footsteps. 28 As with N apster, copyright holders brought these services 
to their knees through partially successful-and more significantly, 
expensive-litigation. 29 Rights holders didn't limit their courtroom 
warfare to file sharing services. ·The Recording Industry Association of 
22. Id. 
23. See Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984) 
(holding that since Betamax technology was capable of substantial 
noninfringing uses, constructive knowledge could not be imputed to 
manufacturers due to manufacturer's sale to general public). 
24. Helman, supra note 21, at 68 ("About seventy percent of the materials 
exchanged utilizing Napster's platform were copyrighted works owned 
by record companies, who sued N apster for contributory and vicarious 
infringement"). 
25. A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(alleging both direct and contributory copyright infringement). 
26. Id. at 1020-21 (noting that while Sony forbade imputing constructive 
knowledge on Napster, since its software was capable of substantial non-
infringing use, the record showed that Napster had actual knowledge of 
infringement on its service). 
27. Helman, supra note 21, at 68-69. 
28. See Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright 
Infringement Without Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 
1359-66 (2004) (discussing Aimster and Grokster). 
29. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 
(2005) (holding that Grokster was liable for contributory copyright 
infringement for distributing software with the object of promoting its 
use to infringe copyright); In re Aimster Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 
2003) (affirming district court's granting of preliminary injunction on 
basis that recording industry had demonstrated a likelihood of 
prevailing on the merits of its copyright infringement claim). 
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feature gave Napster two distinct advantages. First, its file transfer 
process was much faster than that of its rivals, who relied on a 
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(2005) (holding that Grokster was liable for contributory copyright 
infringement for distributing software with the object of promoting its 
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America (RIAA) also embarked on an extensive, unpopular lawsuit 
campaign against individual file sharers.30 The recording industr?''s 
repeated choice of litigation over licensing showed that the maJor 
labels viewed file sharing as the industry's number one enemy. Yet, 
despite the RIAA's expensive game of whack-a-mole, file sharing lived 
on as new services like Lime Wire emerged to replace those put 
under.31 
While the major labels viewed file sharing as a threat, other music 
industry stakeholders thought quite differently-that file sharing 
represented a healthy market that was simply in need of 
monetization. Industry leaders like Eddie Schwartz, renowned 
songwriter and President of the Songwriters Association_ of C~nada 
(SAC), noted that file sharing is simply the modern mamfestat10n of 
the innate inevitable human urge to share music. 32 Rather than 
wasting e~ergy trying to stop the inevitable music sharing 
phenomenon, says Schwartz, the industry should focus on how to 
monetize it.33 Over the past several years, scholars and industry 
leaders have proposed a number of models for monetizing existing file 
sharing activity. Schwartz and SAC have advocated for an opt-in 
blanket license, issued to end users via their Internet service providers 
(ISPs).34 For a nominal monthly fee of around $5, users would have 







See Helman, supra note 21, at 70. 
Menasche, supra note 16 at 283-84 (noting that programs like Lime Wire 
and Bearshare emerged and instead of a central server model, these 
programs "rapidly pass along search queries from machine to ma~hine 
along the network--making it legally difficult to stop since there is no 
one computer in charge"). 
Our Proposal: Summary, SONGWRJTERS Assoc. OF CANADA (Jan. 2011), 
http://songwriters.ca/proposalsummary.aspx ("Peopl~ have always 
shared music and always will. The music we share defmes who we are, 
and who our friends and peers are. The importance of music in the 
fabric of our own culture, as well as those around the world, is 
inextricably bound to the experience of sharing."). 
Id. ("Rather than continuing to engage in increasingly ~tile efforts to 
stop people from using new technologies to share music, we at the 
Songwriters Association of Canada believe this massive use of ~reators' 
work should be licensed just as live performances and broadcastmg, also 
initially considered infringement, were ultimately licensed in t~e past. In 
both these previous examples, new business models, dynamic growth, 
and decades a wonderful music ensued"). 
Id. ("ISPs would partner with collectives in order to facilitate the 
licensing process. Access and content could be bundled. The proposed 
license fee would appear as a line item on monthly Internet access 
statements sent to consumers by ISPs"). 
Id. ("Private individuals and households who wish to music file-share 
would be licensed to do so in conjunction with an agreement to pay a 
reasonable monthly license fee. The license would cover the private, 
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suggested proposals from a mandatory "music tax" to wholesale 
copyright reform.36 While these proposals have generated much 
discussion, none have been implemented, probably because each 
would likely require substantial legislation. 37 
Although the power of congressional inertia largely stifled these 
proposals, an innovative entrepreneur in Sweden would soon introduce 
a legal alternative to file sharing that required zero legislative 
intervention. 
B. Spotify: A Legal Alternative to File Sharing 
Music streaming service Spotify opened its digital doors to 
listeners in Europe in October 2008.38 Spotify was the brainchild of 
Daniel Ek, a then-27 year old web entrepreneur who had already been 
running tech startup companies for ten years prior to starting 
Spotify.39 Aformer Napster user himself, Ek "saw an opportunity to 
create something that made it easier for people to do the stuff that 
they were already doing, but legally. "40 Ek aspired to create a legal 
music sharing service that possessed many of the desirable features of 
its illegal predecessors.41 To realize his vision, Ek recruited the 
creator of the popular file sharing client uTorrent to develop Spotify's 
peer-to-peer system.42 Just as Ek envisioned, Spotify provides much 
noncommercial sharing of music, between two or more parties, using any 
Internet-based file-sharing client ... [C]onsumers may opt out if they 
self-declare not to music file-share"). 
36. See Neil W. Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free 
Peer-to-Peer File Sharing, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2004); Ankur 
Srivastava, The Anti-Competitive Music Industry and the Case for 
Compulsory Licensing in the Digital Distribution of Music, 22 TOURO L. 
REV. 375, 394-95 (2007). 
37. Although the SAC proposal could theoretically be accomplished through 
voluntary licensing, it is unlikely that such an approach would be 
successful in light of the major labels' negotiating history. 
38. Neal Pollack, Spotify Is the Coolest Music Service You Can't Use 
WIRED (Dec. 27, 2010), available at 
http://www.wired.com/magazine/2010/12/mf_spotify/all/1 ("Spotify 
launched in October 2008 and began its European invasion"). 
39. Id. ("Ek has been running tech companies for more than a decade. The 
first was a web design business he launched in 1997 while still a 
teenager living in a Stockholm suburb. He later worked ~s the CTO for 
Stardoll, a virtual paper-doll site for tween girls; started an advertising 
company that got purchased by the Internet marketing outfit 
Tr~deDoubler; and was part of Tradera, a Swedish auction company, 
which eBay bought in 2006"). 
40. Id. 
41. Id. ("Ek wanted to create a legal service that offered the convenience 
and immediacy of file-sharing programs like the original Napster"). 
42. Id. 
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America (RIAA) also embarked on an extensive, unpopular lawsuit 
campaign against individual file sharers.30 The recording industr(s 
repeated choice of litigation over licensing showed that the maJor 
labels viewed file sharing as the industry's number one enemy. Yet, 
despite the RIAA's expensive game of whack-a-mole, file sharing lived 
on as new services like Lime Wire emerged to replace those put 
under.3 i 
While the major labels viewed file sharing as a threat, other music 
industry stakeholders thought quite differently-that file sharing 
represented a healthy market that was simply in need of 
monetization. Industry leaders like Eddie Schwartz, renowned 
songwriter and President of the Songwriters Association. of C~nada 
(SAC), noted that file sharing is simply the mode~n mamfestat10n of 
the innate inevitable human urge to share music. 32 Rather than 
wasting e~ergy trying to stop the inevitable music sharing 
phenomenon, says Schwartz, the industry should focus on . how to 
monetize it.33 Over the past several years, scholars and mdustry 
leaders have proposed a number of models for monetizing existing fi~e 
sharing activity. Schwartz and SAC have advocated f?r an o~t-m 
blanket license, issued to end users via their Internet service providers 
(ISPs).34 For a nominal monthly fee of around $5, users would have 







See Helman, supra note 21, at 70. 
MenascM, supra note 16 at 283-84 (noting that programs like Lime Wire 
and Bearshare emerged and instead of a central server model, these 
programs "rapidly pass along search queries from mac~ine to ma?hine 
along the network--making it legally difficult to stop smce there is no 
one computer in charge"). 
Our Proposal: Summary, SONGWRITERS Assoc. OF CANADA (Jan. 2011), 
http://songwriters.ca/proposalsummary.aspx ("Peopl~ have always 
shared music and always will. The music we share defmes who we are, 
and who our friends and peers are. The importance of music in the 
fabric of our own culture, as well as those around the world, is 
inextricably bound to the experience of sharing."). 
Id. ("Rather than continuing to engage in increasingly TI:tile efforts to 
stop people from using new technolo.gies to. share . music, we at th~ 
Songwriters Association of Canada believe this massive use of ?reators 
work should be licensed just as live performances and broadcastmg, also 
initially considered infringement, were ultimately licensed in t~e past. In 
both these previous examples, new business models, dynamic growth, 
and decades a wonderful music ensued"). 
Id. ("ISPs would partner with collectives in order to facilitate the 
licensing process. Access and content could be bundled. The proposed 
license fee would appear as a line item on monthly Internet access 
statements sent to consumers by ISPs"). 
Id. ("Private individuals and households who wish to music file-share 
would be licensed to do so in conjunction with an agreement to pay a 
reasonable monthly license fee. The license would cover the private, 
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suggested proposals from a mandatory "music tax" to wholesale 
copyright reform.36 While these proposals have generated much 
discussion, none have been implemented, probably because each 
would likely require substantial legislation.37 
Although the power of congressional inertia largely stifled these 
proposals, an innovative entrepreneur in Sweden would soon introduce 
a legal alternative to file sharing that required zero legislative 
intervention. 
B. Spotify: A Legal Alternative to File Sharing 
Music streaming service Spotify opened its digital doors to 
listeners in Europe in October 2008.38 Spotify was the brainchild of 
Daniel Ek, a then-27 year old web entrepreneur who had already been 
running tech startup companies for ten years prior to starting 
Spotify.39 A former Napster user himself, Ek "saw an opportunity to 
create something that made it easier for people to do the stuff that 
they were already doing, but legally. "40 Ek aspired to create a legal 
music sharing service that possessed many of the desirable features of 
its illegal predecessors.4 i To realize his vision, Ek recruited the 
creator of the popular file sharing client uTorrent to develop Spotify's 
peer-to-peer system.42 Just as Ek envisioned, Spotify provides much 
noncommercial sharing of music, between two or more parties, using any 
Internet-based file-sharing client ... [C]onsumers may opt out if they 
self-declare not to music file-share"). 
36. See Neil W. Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free 
Peer-to-Peer File Sharing, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 1 (2004); Ankur 
Srivastava, The Anti-Competitive Music Industry and the Case for 
Compulsory Licensing in the Digital Distribution of Music, 22 TOURO L. 
REV. 375, 394-95 (2007). 
37. Although the SAC proposal could theoretically be accomplished through 
voluntary licensing, it is unlikely that such an approach would be 
successful in light of the major labels' negotiating history. 
38. Neal Pollack, Spotify Is the Coolest Music Service You Can't Use 
WIRED (Dec. 27, 2010), available at 
http://www.wired.com/magazine/2010/12/mf_spotify/all/1 ("Spotify 
launched in October 2008 and began its European invasion"). 
39. Id. ("Ek has been running tech companies for more than a decade. The 
first was a web design business he launched in 1997 while still a 
teenager living in a Stockholm suburb. He later worked ~s the CTO for 
Stardoll, a virtual paper-doll site for tween girls; started an advertising 
company that got purchased by the Internet marketing outfit 
TradeDoubler; and was part of Tradera, a Swedish auction company, 
which eBay bought in 2006"). 
40. Id. 
41. Id. ("Ek wanted to create a legal service that offered the convenience 
and immediacy of file-sharing programs like the original Napster"). 
42. Id. 
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of the same appeal as illegal file sharing clients. It gives users access 
to a nearly limitless catalogue-15 million songs, as of July 2011.43 
Further, the service enables users to easily share songs, albums, and 
playlists with other Spotify users via Facebook integration.44 Unlike 
its illegal counterparts, Spotify does not allow users to download mp3 
files without first purchasing them in addition to the monthly 
subscription.45 So, although the service does not give users absolute 
control over discrete files, Spotify does offer two other key features of 
file-sharing clients: access and sharing. 
Spotify wasn't the first streaming service on the block: Rhapsody, 
a paid music subscription service, opened in 2001, seven years before 
the advent of Spotify.46 Spotify differs from most of its competitors, 
though, in its "freemium" philosophy-attract users with a limited-
feature, free version of your product, then convert a percentage of 
these users to a premium, paid subscription version.47 Sean Parker, 
founder of N apster and a recent Spotify investor, described at a recent 
tech conference how freemium works for Spotify: 
You end up building a music library that's 100 times bigger than 
anything you've ever had, and at that point you have no choice-
we've got you by the balls. If you want that content on your iPod, 
you're going to have to pay for it; if you want that content on your 
iPhone, you're going to have to become a subscriber.48 
Spotify offers three tiers of accounts: Spotify Free, Spotify 
Unlimited, and Spotify Premium.49 Spotify's free subscription gives 
43. Dan Check, Spotify vs. Girl Talk: What Is Spotify's Music Catalog 
Missing?, SLATE (Jul. 22, 2011,5:53 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/browbeat/2011/07 /22/spotify_vs_girl_tal 
k_ what_is_spotify _s_music_catalog_missing_.html. 
44. What is Spotify?, SPOTIFY, http://www.spotify.com/us/about/what/ 
(last visited Nov. 24, 2011). 
45. Music Purchases, 
http://www.spotify.com/us/about/features/music-purchases/ 
visited Nov. 24, 2011). 
SPOTIFY, 
(last 
46. Curt Woodward, Rhapsody at 10 Years: Surviving Long Enough to Face 
a Herd of New Competitors, XCONOMY (Nov. 30, 2011), 
http://www.xconomy.com/seattle/2011/11/30/rhapsody-at-10/ 
(describing Rhapsody as "one of the original subscription music services 
in the U.S." and recognizing its existence since 2001). 
47. Katherine Heires, Why It Pays to Give Away the Store, Bus. 2.0, Oct. 1, 
2006, available at http://money.cnn.com/magazines/business2/ 
businese2_archive/2006/10/01/8387115/indext.htm (describing 
freemium and detailing steps for how to effectively make money from 
the freemium model). 
48. Pollack, supra note 37. 
49. Get Spotify Free, SPOTIFY, http://www.spotify.com/us/get-
spotify /open/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2011). 
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users access to the service's entire music catalog, but limits the 
number of songs a user may play each month.50 The free account is 
advertising-funded, featuring both audio and graphic advertising 
formats. 51 Since Spotify has not released a standardized rate sheet 
' 
nor have any of Spotify's advertising contract terms become public, it 
is not clear how much the service makes per month from advertising 
revenue. Spotify Unlimited provides an unlimited, advertising-free 
listening experience for $5 per month.52 At $10 per month, Spotify 
Premium includes features like offline listening, a mobile app, 
enhanced sound quality, exclusive content, early ·album releases, and 
sound system compatibility.53 
C. How Musicians Make Money on Spotify 
· Though inspired by illicit file sharing activity and sharing m~ny 
of the characteristics of illegal peer-to-peer clients, Spotify aims to 
accomplish something that Napster and its peers did not: monetizing 
music on artists' behalf.54 Spotify's activities implicate three rights 
under U.S. federal copyright law: the public performance, mechanical, 
and sound recording rights. 55 Spotify acquires licenses from the 
intermediaries who manage these rights. 56 These intermediaries, in 
turn, pay a share of royalties to artists and songwriters based on pre-
existing contracts. 
Since streaming music requires that copies of songs be made, 
Spotify must pay mechanical royalties owed to songwriters and 
publishers because U.S.C. § 106(3) gives the owners of musical works 
the exclusive right to reproduce "phonorecords. "57 Unlike other 
licenses required for streaming, the mechanical license is compulsory, 
so Spotify does not negotiate with anyone, but simply pays 
mechanical royalties to the Harry Fox Agency, an agency that collects 
50. Id. 
Advertising, SPOTIFY, . http://www.spotify.com/us/work-with-
us/advertisers/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2011). · 
51. 
52. Get Spotify Free, supra note 48. 
53. Id. 
54. Krazit, supra note 3. 
55. See 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2010); See also 17 U.S.C. § 114; 17 U.S.C. § 106 
(2002). 
56. Id. 
57. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2002)."Phonorecords" are "material objects in which 
sounds, other than those accompanying a motion picture or other 
audiovisual work, are fixed by any method now known or later 
developed, and from which the sounds can be perceived, reproduced, or 
otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or 
device." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2010). 
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of the same appeal as illegal file sharing clients. It gives users access 
to a nearly limitless catalogue-15 million songs, as of July 2011.43 
Further, the service enables users to easily share songs, albums, and 
playlists with other Spotify users via Facebook integration.44 Unlike 
its illegal counterparts, Spotify does not allow users to download mp3 
files without first purchasing them in addition to the monthly 
subscription.45 So, although the service does not give users absolute 
control over discrete files, Spotify does offer two other key features of 
file-sharing clients: access and sharing. 
Spotify wasn't the first streaming service on the block: Rhapsody, 
a paid music subscription service, opened in 2001, seven years before 
the advent of Spotify.46 Spotify differs from most of its competitors, 
though, in its "freemium" philosophy-attract users with a limited-
feature, free version of your product, then convert a percentage of 
these users to a premium, paid subscription version.47 Sean Parker, 
founder of N apster and a recent Spotify investor, described at a recent 
tech conference how freemium works for Spotify: 
You end up building a music library that's 100 times bigger than 
anything you've ever had, and at that point you have no choice-
we've got you by the balls. If you want that content on your iPod, 
you're going to have to pay for it; if you want that content on your 
iPhone, you're going to have to become a subscriber.48 
Spotify offers three tiers of accounts: Spotify Free, Spotify 
Unlimited, and Spotify Premium.49 Spotify's free subscription gives 
43. Dan Check, Spotify vs. Girl Talk: What Is Spotify's Music Catalog 
Missing?, SLATE (Jul. 22, 2011,5:53 PM), 
http://www.slate.com/blogs/browbeat/2011/07 /22/spotify_vs_girl_tal 
k_ what_is_spotify _s_music_catalog_missing_.html. 
44. What is Spotijy?, SPOTIFY, http://www.spotify.com/us/about/what/ 
(last visited Nov. 24, 2011). 
45. Music Purchases, 
http://www.spotify.com/us/about/features/music-purchases/ 
visited Nov. 24, 2011). 
SPOTIFY, 
(last 
46. Curt Woodward, Rhapsody at 10 Years: Surviving Long Enough to Face 
a Herd of New Competitors, XCONOMY (Nov. 30, 2011), 
http://www.xconomy.com/seattle/2011/11/30/rhapsody-at-10/ 
(describing Rhapsody as "one of the original subscription music services 
in the U.S." and recognizing its existence since 2001). 
47. Katherine Heires, Why It Pays to Give Away the Store, Bus. 2.0, Oct. 1, 
2006, available at http://money.cnn.com/magazines/business2/ 
businese2_archive/2006/10/01/8387115/indext.htm (describing 
freemium and detailing steps for how to effectively make money from 
the freemium model). 
48. Pollack, supra note 37. 
49. Get Spotify Free, SPOTIFY, http://www.spotify.com/us/get-
spotify /open/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2011). 
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users access to the service's entire music catalog, but limits the 
number of songs a user may play each month.50 The free account is 
advertising-funded, featuring both audio and graphic advertising 
formats. 51 Since Spotify has not released a standardized rate sheet, 
nor have any of Spotify's advertising contract terms become public, it 
is not clear how much the service makes per month from advertising 
revenue. Spotify Unlimited provides an unlimited, advertising-free 
listening experience for $5 per month.52 At $10 per month, Spotify 
Premium includes features like offline listening, a mobile app, 
enhanced sound quality, exclusive content, early ·album releases, and 
sound system compatibility. 53 
C. How Musicians Make Money on Spotify 
Though inspired by illicit file sharing activity and sharing m~ny 
of the characteristics of illegal peer-to-peer clients, Spotify aims to 
accomplish something that Napster and its peers did not: monetizing 
music on artists' behalf.54 Spotify's activities implicate three rights 
under U.S. federal copyright law: the public performance, mechanical, 
and sound recording rights. 55 Spotify acquires licenses from the 
intermediaries who manage these rights. 56 These intermediaries, in 
turn, pay a share of royalties to artists and songwriters based on pre-
existing contracts. 
Since streaming music requires that copies of songs be made, 
Spotify must pay mechanical royalties owed to songwriters and 
publishers because U.S.C. § 106(3) gives the owners of musical works 
the exclusive right to reproduce "phonorecords. "57 Unlike other 
licenses required for streaming, the mechanical license is compulsory, 
so Spotify does not negotiate with anyone, but simply pays 
mechanical royalties to the Harry Fox Agency, an agency that collects 
50. Id. 
Advertising, SPOTIFY, . http://www.spotify.com/us/work-with-
us/advertisers/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2011). · 
51. 
52. Get Spotijy Free, supra note 48. 
53. Id. 
54. Krazit, supra note 3. 
55. See 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2010); See also 17 U.S.C. § 114; 17 U.S.C. § 106 
(2002). 
56. Id. 
57. 17 U.S.C. § 106(3) (2002). "Phonorecords" are "material objects in which 
sounds, other than those accompanying a motion picture or other 
audiovisual work, are fixed by any method now known or later 
developed, and from which the sounds can be perceived, reproduced, or 
otherwise communicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or 
device." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (2010). 
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mechanical license royalties on behalf of rights holders. 58 Harry Fox, 
in turn, pays royalties to rights holders, after retaining a small 
percentage fee. 59 In contrast to the public performance and sound 
recording licenses, it requires absolutely no bargaining over royalty 
rates. All Spotify must do to obtain a mechanical license is pay the 
statutory rate to Harry Fox. 60 
Since streaming music counts as a "public performance" under the 
Copyright Act,61 Spotify must license the public performance right for 
its entire catalog. However, Spotify does not negotiate these licenses 
directly from publishers or songwriters; rights holders generally 
delegate this responsibility to a performing rights organization 
("PR0").62 Thus, to secure the public perform~nc~ right for ~usical 
works, Spotify negotiates with PROs, who d1stnbute royalties to 
songwriters and publishers on a pro rata basis.63 Spotify reac~ed 
deals with PROs such as,· the American Society of Composers, Artists 
and Producers (ASCAP);64 Broadcast Music Inc (BMI);65 and the 
Society of European Stage Authors and Composers (SESAC)66 right 
before the service's U.S. launch. These licenses were more difficult for 










Ed Christman, Harry Fox Agency Inks Deal With Spotify for Publishing 
Licensing, And More, BILLBOARD (Jul. 18, 2011), 
http://www.billboard.biz/bbbiz/industry /publishing/harry-fox-agency-
inks-deal-with-spotify-1005281812.story; About Harry Fox Agency, 
HARRYFOX AGENCY, http:/ /www.harryfox.com/public/ AboutHF A.jsp 
(last visited Nov. 24, 2011) (noting that Harry Fox Agency is the 
leading mechanical licensing agency in the U.S.). 
Id. 
Id. 
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2010) (to perform a work publicly means "to transmit 
or otherwise communicate a performance ... to the public, by means of 
any device or process, whether the members of the public capable ?f 
receiving the performance or display receive it in the same place or m 
separate places and at the same time or at different times"). 
See AL KOHN & BOB KOHN, KOHN ON MUSIC LICENSING (Aspen 3d. 
Edition 2002) (noting that ASCAP and BMI control performance rights 
for almost all the music performed in the U.S.). 
See infra notes 63-5. 
Billboard Staff, ASCAP Announces U.S. Licensing Agreement With 
Spotify, BILLBOARD (Jul. 14, . 2011), 
http://www.billboard.biz/bbbiz/industry /publishing/ascap-announces-
u-s-licensing-agreement-1005277172.story. 
BMI Inks Spotify to Licensing Deal, ALL ACCESS (Jul. 25, 2011), 
http://www.allaccess.com/net-news/archive/story /94194/bmi-inks-
spotify-to-licensing-deal. 
SESAC Finalizes Deal With Spotify, SESAC.coM (Jul. 22, 2011), 
http://www.sesac.com/N ews /N ews_Details.aspx?id=l 5 75. 
216 
JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY& THE INTERNET· VOL. 4 ·No. l · 2012 
Saving the Spotify Revolution 
performance rights are not technically compulsory. Nonetheless, the 
two biggest U.S.-based PROs, ASCAP and BMI, are subject to 
antitrust consent decrees that effectively compel them to license. 67 If 
Spotify had not been able to reach an agreement with ASCAP or 
BMI, the New York district court, designated as the "rate court," 
would have judicially determined the terms of the agreement based on 
a "willing buyer, willing seller" standard.68 
In addition to royalties for the public performance right-a right 
owned by publishers and songwriters-Spotify must pay royalties to 
the owners of sound recordings in accordance with 17 U.S.C. § 106(6), 
which gives sound recording owners the exclusive right to "perform 
the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio 
transmission. "69 Under the Digital Right in Sound Recordings Act, a 
service provider is eligible for a statutory compulsory license of a 
sound recording if the service is "non-interactive," whereas 
"interactive" service providers must negotiate directly with rights 
holders. 70 A service is interactive if it "enables a member of the 
public to receive a transmission of a program specially created for the 
recipient, or on request, a transmission of a particular sound 
recording, whether or not as part of a program, which is selected by 
or on behalf of the recipient. "71 Internet radio services like Pandora 
are "non-interactive" because they give listeners minimal input into 
what they hear. 72 In contrast, since Spotify allows users to build 
individualized playlists and play songs on demand, it is an 
67. See United States v. American Society of Composers, Authors & 
Publishers, 1941 Trade Cas. (CCH) para. 56, 104, 1941 U.S. Dist. Lexis 
3944 (S.D.N.Y. 1941); United States v. Broad. Music Indus., 1940-1943 






For a description and example of a "rate court" setting agreement 
terms, see David Oxenford, Rate Court Determines ASCAP Fees for 
Large Webcasters - Some Interesting Contrasts with The Copyright 
Royalty Board Decision, BROAD. LAW BLOG (May 1, 2008), 
http://www.broadcastlawblog.com/2008/05/articles/internet-radio/rate-
court-determines-ascap-fees-for-large-we bcasters-some-in teresting-
contrasts-with-the-copyrigh t-royalty-board-decision (examining a 2008 
New York district court decision where the court set agreement terms 
between ASCAP and Yahoo, AOL, and Real Networks for use of 
ASCAP's composers' music). 
17 u.s.c. § 106(6) (2002). 
17 u.s.c. § 115 (2010). 
17 u.s.c. § 114(j)(7) (2010). 
Ari Z. Moskowitz, Predictability and Interactivity: An Examination of 
Arista Records, LLC v. Launch Media, Inc., 38 AIPLA Q.J. 471, 496 
(2010) ("Pandora, by far the best-known Internet radio service today, 
implemented technology similar to LAUNCHcast, such as prohibiting 
rewinding and limiting the number of times a user can skip a song, in 
order to remain within the bounds of a noninteractive service"). 
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mechanical license royalties on behalf of rights holders. 58 Harry Fox, 
in turn, pays royalties to rights holders, after retaining a small 
percentage fee. 59 In contrast to the public performance and sound 
recording licenses, it requires absolutely no bargaining over royalty 
rates. All Spotify must do to obtain a mechanical license is pay the 
statutory rate to Harry Fox. 60 
Since streaming music counts as a "public performance" under the 
Copyright Act,61 Spotify must license the public performance right for 
its entire catalog. However, Spotify does not negotiate these licenses 
directly from publishers or songwriters; rights holders generally 
delegate this responsibility to a performing rights organization 
("PR0").62 Thus, to secure the public perform~nc~ right for ~usical 
works, Spotify negotiates with PROs, who distribute royalties to 
songwriters and publishers on a pro rata basis.63 Spotify reac~ed 
deals with PROs such as,· the American Society of Composers, Artrnts 
and Producers (ASCAP);64 Broadcast Music Inc (BMI);65 and the 
Society of European Stage Authors and Composers (SESAC)66 right 
before the service's U.S. launch. These licenses were more difficult for 










Ed Christman, Harry Fox Agency Inks Deal With Spotify for Publishing 
Licensing, And More, BILLBOARD (Jul. 18, 2011), 
http://www.billboard.biz/bbbiz/industry /publishing/harry-fox-agency-
inks-deal-with-spotify-1005281812.story; About Harry Fox Agency, 
HARRYFOX AGENCY, http:/ /www.harryfox.com/public/ AboutH~ A.jsp 
(last visited Nov. 24, 2011) (noting that Harry Fox Agency is the 
leading mechanical licensing agency in the U.S.). 
Id. 
Id. 
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2010) (to perform a work publicly means "to transmit 
or otherwise communicate a performance ... to the public, by means of 
any device or process, whether the members of the public capable ?f 
receiving the performance ·or display receive it in the same place or m 
separate places and at the same time or at different times"). 
See AL KOHN & BOB KOHN, KOHN ON MUSIC LICENSING (Aspe11; 3d. 
Edition 2002) (noting that ASCAP and BMI control performance nghts 
for almost all the music performed in the U.S.). 
See infra notes 63-5. 
Billboard Staff, ASCAP Announces U.S. Licensing Agreement With 
Spotify, BILLBOARD (Jul. 14, . 2011), 
http://www.billboard.biz/bbbiz/industry /publishing/ascap-announces-
u-s-licensing-agreement-1005277172.story. 
BMI Inks Spotify to Licensing Deal, ALL ACCESS (Jul. 25, 2011), 
http://www.allaccess.com/net-news/archive/story /94194/bmi-inks-
spotify-to-licensing-deal. 
SESAC Finalizes Deal With Spotify, SESAC.coM (Jul. 22, 2011), 
http://www.sesac.com/News/News_Details.aspx?id=1575. 
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performance rights are not technically compulsory. Nonetheless, the 
two biggest U.S.-based PROs, ASCAP and BMI, are subject to 
antitrust consent decrees that effectively compel them to license. 67 If 
Spotify had not been able to reach an agreement with ASCAP or 
BMI, the New York district court, designated as the "rate court," 
would have judicially determined the terms of the agreement based on 
a "willing buyer, willing seller" standard.68 
In addition to royalties for the public performance right-a right 
owned by publishers and songwriters-Spotify must pay royalties to 
the owners of sound recordings in accordance with 17 U.S.C. § 106(6), 
which gives sound recording owners the exclusive right to "perform 
the copyrighted work publicly by means of a digital audio 
transmission. "69 Under the Digital Right in Sound Recordings Act, a 
service provider is eligible for a statutory compulsory license of a 
sound recording if the service is "non-interactive," whereas 
"interactive" service providers must negotiate directly with rights 
holders. 70 A service is interactive if it "enables a member of the 
public to receive a transmission of a program specially created for the 
recipient, or on request, a transmission of a particular sound 
recording, whether or not as part of a program, which is selected by 
or on behalf of the recipient. "71 Internet radio services like Pandora 
are "non-interactive" because they give listeners minimal input into 
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67. See _United States v. American Society of Composers, Authors & 
Publishers, 1941 Trade Cas. (CCH) para. 56, 104, 1941 U.S. Dist. Lexis 
3944 (S.D.N.Y. 1941); United States v. Broad. Music Indus., 1940-1943 






For a description and example of a "rate court" setting agreement 
terms, see David Oxenford, Rate Court Determines ASCAP Fees for 
Large Webcasters - Some Interesting Contrasts with The Copyright 
Royalty Board Decision, BROAD. LAW BLOG (May 1, 2008), 
http://www.broadcastlawblog.com/2008/05/articles/internet-radio/rate-
court-determines-ascap-fees-for-large-webcasters-some-interesting-
contrasts-with-the-copyright-royalty-board-decision (examining a 2008 
New York district court decision where the court set agreement terms 
between ASCAP and Yahoo, AOL, and Real Networks for use of 
ASCAP's composers' music). 
17 u.s.c. § 106(6) (2002). 
17 u.s.c. § 115 (2010). 
17 u.s.c. § 114(j)(7) (2010). 
Ari Z. Moskowitz, Predictability and Interactivity: An Examination of 
Arista Records, LLC v. Launch Media, Inc., 38 AIPLA Q.J. 471, 496 
~2010) ("Pandora, by far the best-known Internet radio service today, 
implemented technology similar to LAUNCHcast, such as prohibiting 
rewinding and limiting the number of times a user can skip a song, in 
order to remain within the bounds of a noninteractive service"). 
217 
JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY& THE INTERNET· VOL. 4 ·No. I· 2012 
Saving the Spotify Revolution 
"interactive" service provider that must negotiate licenses with sound 
recording owners. 
Spotify has direct deals with the major U.S. labels-deals that 
took over two years to negotiate.73 Spotify does not negotiate directly 
with independent labels or artists, but rather, contracts with artist 
aggregators74 like CD Baby, who in turn have contracts with 
independent artists,75 and the Merlin Network, a rights agency that 
represents independent labels worldwide. 76 The amount 
intermediaries pay to artists is determined by pre-existing contracts. 
Undoubtedly, sound recording licenses are the most difficult licenses 
for Spotify to obtain. Unlike the mechanical and public performance 
rights, which are both .essentially compulsory, the sound recording 
right is completely negotiable. Thus, Spotify had the difficult task of 
persuading sound recording owners-in particular, the major labels-
to license their libraries. 
D. Spotify's au.s. Invasion": Persuading the Major Labels 
Spotify was not available in the U.S. until late 2011, when it 
finally closed deals with the major record labels.77 Getting the major 
labels on board was critical to a successful U.S. launch, for without 
the major labels' catalogues, Spotify's library would have indeed been 
spotty.78 Despite the major labels' blemished history of attempting to 
chokehold music distribution,79 ASCAP, BMI, and SESAC had 
already licensed its libraries to other music streaming services like 
Rhapsody and Rdio for use in the United States. Persuading the 
labels to join Spotify was not a pipe dream. 
73. See infra Part I.D. 
74. An "artist aggregator" is a company that serves as a one-stop shop for 
independent artists seeking to distribute their music. Artist aggregators 
help artists distribute their music through physical CD sales, mp3 
downloads, and streaming services. For an example, see About CD 
Baby, CDBABY.COM, http://www.cdbaby.com/ About (last visited Nov. 
24, 2011). 
75. Artist Page, SPOTIFY, http://www.spotify.com/us/work-with-us/labels-
and-artists/artist-page (last visited Nov. 24, 2011). 
76. Welcome to Merlin, MERLIN NETWORK, 
http://www.merlinnetwork.org/home/ (last visited Nov. 24; 2011). 
77. See Roberts, supra note 1 (describing initial reaction to Spotify's 
American debut). 
78. See 2010 Quarter 1 Marketshare for Major Music Labels, 
ROUTENOTE.COM (Mar. 26, 2010) (reporting that major labels had over 
803 combined market share in 2010). 
79. See Srivastava, supra note 35, at 394-95. (discussing how major labels 
used cooperative marketing programs to monopolize CD distribution). 
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But Spotify was different from these other streaming services in 
one critical respect-its "freemium" philosophy. For the first two 
years of Spotify's existence, the U.S. major labels spoke out against 
freemium streaming services, concerned about Spotify's single-digit 
free-to-paid conversion rate.80 Even as late as February 2010, Warner 
Music CEO Edgar Bronfman, Jr. reported to Wired that "this sort of 
'get all the music you want for free and then maybe we can-with a 
few bells and whistles-move you to a premium price' strategy is not 
the kind of approach to business that we will be supporting in the 
future."81 Nonetheless, Spotify persisted through two years of arduous 
negotiations, finally striking deals with the majors in mid-2011-a 
point to be discussed more below. 82 
With the major labels on board in the U.S. market, the Spotify 
ship was sailing toward success. Or was it? As it turns out, artists 
have not shared Daniel Ek's optimism about the service's potential to 
welcome in a golden age of music-and with good reason. 
II. DESTINED FOR DOWNFALL: WHY THE SPOTIFY 
REVOLUTION WILL FAIL 
At first glance, it seems puzzling that musicians would not be 
cheering on a service designed to monetize digital music. A closer 
look shows why artists indeed have reason to fear Spotify. The U.S. 
major record labels are significant shareholders in the service; this 
means that t}+ey have insider influence over Spotify and suggests that 
the labels' incentives were not aligned with those of artists when they 
were negotiating license agreements.83 Spotify's refusal to be 
transparent about its financial flows suggests that money is passing 
by artists and disappearing into the 'black box' of shareholder (i.e. 
major label) profits.84 The fact that independent artists earn paltry 
royalties worth fractions of a cent makes this possibility even more 
80. Ben Sisario, Spotify Steps Closer to U.S. With Universal Deal, N.Y. 
TIMES MEDIA DECODER BLOG (Jun. 10, 2011, 6:42 PM), 
http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/06/10/spotify-steps-closer-
to-u-s-with-universal-deal ("Throughout their long negotiations with 
Spotify, American label executives were concerned that the company's 
conversion rate of free to paid users was too low, and that the company 
was giving away too much music"). 
81. Pollack, supra note 37. 
82. See Brendan Greeley, Spotify Wins Over Music Pirates With Labels' 
Approval, BLOOMBERG (Jul. 14, 2011, 10:46 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-07-14/spotify-wins-over-music-
pirates-with-labels-approval-correct-.html. 
83. See infra Part II.A.i. 
84. See infra Part II.A.ii. 
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rights, which are both .essentially compulsory, the sound recording 
right is completely negotiable. Thus, Spotify had the difficult task of 
persuading sound recording owners-in particular, the major labels-
to license their libraries. 
D. Spotify's "U.S. Invasion": Persuading the Major Labels 
Spotify was not available in the U.S. until late 2011, when it 
finally closed deals with the major record labels.77 Getting the major 
labels on board was critical to a successful U.S. launch, for without 
the major labels' catalogues, Spotify's library would have indeed been 
spotty.78 Despite the major labels' blemished history of attempting to 
chokehold music distribution,79 ASCAP, BMI, and SESAC had 
already licensed its libraries to other music streaming services like 
Rhapsody and Rdio for use in the United States. Persuading the 
labels to join Spotify was not a pipe dream. 
73. See infra Part I.D. 
74. An "artist aggregator" is a company that serves as a one-stop shop for 
independent artists seeking to distribute their music. Artist aggregators 
help artists distribute their music through physical CD sales, mp3 
downloads, and streaming services. For an example, see About CD 
Baby, CDBABY.COM, http://www.cdbaby.com/ About (last visited Nov. 
24, 2011). 
75. Artist Page, SPOTIFY, http://www.spotify.com/us/work-with-us/labels-
and-artists/artist-page (last visited Nov. 24, 2011). 
76. Welcome to Merlin, MERLIN NETWORK, 
http://www.merlinnetwork.org/home/ (last visited Nov. 24; 2011). 
77. See Roberts, supra note 1 (describing initial reaction to Spotify's 
American debut). 
78. See 2010 Quarter 1 Marketshare for Major Music Labels, 
ROUTENOTE.COM (Mar. 26, 2010) (reporting that major labels had over 
803 combined market share in 2010). 
79. See Srivastava, supra note 35, at 394-95. (discussing how major labels 
used cooperative marketing programs to monopolize CD distribution). 
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But Spotify was different from these other streaming services in 
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years of Spotify's existence, the U.S. major labels spoke out against 
freemium streaming services, Concerned about Spotify's single-digit 
free-to-paid conversion rate.80 Even as late as February 2010, Warner 
Music CEO Edgar Bronfman, Jr. reported to Wired that "this sort of 
'get all the music you want for free and then maybe we can-with a 
few bells and whistles-move you to a premium price' strategy is not 
the kind of approach to business that we will be supporting in the 
future. "81 Nonetheless, Spotify persisted through two years of arduous 
negotiations, finally striking deals with the majors in mid-2011-a 
point to be discussed more below.82 
With the major labels on board in the U.S. market, the Spotify 
ship was sailing toward success. Or was it? As it turns out, artists 
have not shared Daniel Ek's optimism about the service's potential to 
welcome in a golden age of music-and with good reason. 
II. DESTINED FOR DOWNFALL: WHY THE SPOTIFY 
REVOLUTION WILL FAIL 
At first glance, it seems puzzling that musicians would not be 
cheering on a service designed to monetize digital music. A closer 
look shows why artists indeed have reason to fear Spotify. The U.S. 
major record labels are significant shareholders in the service; this 
means that they have insider influence over Spotify and suggests that 
the labels' incentives were not aligned with those of artists when they 
were negotiating license agreements. 83 Spotify's refusal to be 
transparent about its financial flows suggests that money is passing 
by artists and disappearing into the 'black box' of shareholder (i.e. 
major label) profits.84 The fact that independent artists earn paltry 
royalties worth fractions of a cent makes this possibility even more 
80. Ben Sisario, Spotify Steps Closer to U.S. With Universal Deal, N.Y. 
TIMES MEDIA DECODER BLOG (Jun. 10, 2011, 6:42 PM), 
http://mediadecoder.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/06/10/spotify-steps-closer-
to-u-s-with-universal-deal ("Throughout their long negotiations with 
Spotify, American label executives were concerned that the company's 
conversion rate of free to paid users was too low, and that the company 
was giving away too much music"). 
81. Pollack, supra note 37. 
82. See Brendan Greeley, Spotify Wins Over Music Pirates With Labels' 
Approval, BLOOMBERG (Jul. 14, 2011, 10:46 AM), 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-07-14/spotify-wins-over-music-
pirates-with-labels-approval-correct-.html. 
83. See infra Part II.A.i. 
84. See infra Part II.A.ii. 
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likely.85 As music listeners increasingly substitute streaming music for 
mp3 purchases, independent artists are left with the choice of 
remaining on the service and earning pennies or abandoning the 
services and potentially earning nil on recorded music. 86 Many artists 
have chosen the latter, leaving Spotify in hopes of finding other ways 
to monetize their music.87 Similarly, once-loyal customers have begun 
defecting from the service, disturbed by its treatment of the artists 
they love. Ironically, Spotify has managed to alienate the very people 
whose interests they claim to advocate-the same people on whom 
they rely for success. Without the buy-in of musicians, Spotify 
cannot realize its vision of providing "[a]ll the music, all the time, "88 
nor can it expect to attract avid music fans, who care about artist 
compensation. 
A. The Dark Side of Spotify 
1. Conflict of Interest with Artists 
From their monopoly over CD sales to their litigious battle 
against file sharing, the major record labels have a long history of 
trying to maintain a chokehold on music distribution. Not much has 
changed with the emergence of streaming music, as the major labels 
have an ownership stake in Spotify.89 A search of Sweden's 
corporation records database confirmed that both the major labels 
and the Merlin Network purchased about 183 of Spotify- worth 
$250 million at that time90-for a little less than $10,000.91 This has 
two powerful implications. 
First, equity means a seat at Spotify's board of directors' table. 
With a reputation for maximizing profits at the expense of artists, the 
major labels are hardly a musician's first choice for a director of 
Spotify. Second, the major labels, as copyright holders and 
shareholders, earn money from Spotify from two sources: 1) royalties, 
which are shared with artists; and 2) profits, which are not shared 
85. See infra Part II.A.iii. 






See infra Part II.B. 
What Can Spotify Do?, SPOTIFY, http://www.spotify.com/us/about/ 
features/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2012). 
Helienne Lindvall, Behind the Music: The Real Reason Why the Major 
Labels Love Spotify, THE GUARDIAN MUSIC BLOG (Aug. 17, 2009, 10:03 
AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/music/musicblog/2009/aug/17 /major-
labels-spotify: 
Glenn Peoples, Is Spotify Really Worth 1 Billion?, BILLBOARD (Feb. ~2, 
2011), http://www.billboard.biz/bbbiz/industry /digital-and-mobile/1s-
spotify-really-worth-l-billion-l 005043612.story. 
Lindvall, supra note 88. 
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with artists. 92 This means that the labels' interests were not aligned 
with artists' interests during negotiations with Spotify. In other 
words, the labels may have been happy with lower-than-fair royalty 
rates, since they stood to earn money from Spotify through other 
avenues. 
For both of these reasons, Spotify has an inescapable conflict of 
interest with artists, one that has not gone unnoticed by the 
independent music community. For instance, independent label 
Prosthetic Records announced in mid-September that it would be 
pulling its artists· from Spotify because "[i]ndependent labels are 
getting the short end of the stick. "93 Prosthetic noted that since the 
major labels have an equity stake in Spotify, artists at major labels 
are effectively treated with preference over independent artists. 94 
According to Prosthetic, "Spotify as it's currently configured will 'kill 
... smaller bands that are already struggling to make ends meet. '"95 
2. Lack of Financial Transparency 
Suspicious of Spotify for its involvement with the major labels, 
artists and fans have expressed a desire to know where the money 
goes once it passes into Spotify's hands. Nonetheless, Spotify has 
resisted releasing information about how it allocates revenue. Spotify 
gives canned, general responses to inquiries about its financial flows, 
saying that it "ha[s] deals with all the major record labels and 
recording rights institutions to ensure that artists receive 
compensation for being part of Spotify, "96 or that it, "respect[s] 
creativity and believe[s] in fairly compensating artists for their work. 
[Spotify has] cleared the rights to use the music you'll listen to in 
92. See Pascal-Emmanuel Gobry, How Spotify's Business Works, BUSINESS 
INSIDER (Oct. 12, 2011), http://articles.businessinsider.com/2011-10-
12/research/30269526_1_spotify-revenues-cost (detailing how Spotify 
makes its money and describing how it must pay royalties to record 
labels). 
93. Vince Neilstein, Breaking: Prosthetic Records Will Pull Artists From 




95. Jason Roche, Prosthetic Records is the Third L.A. Metal Label to Pull 
Their Catalog Off of Spotify, LAWEEKLY BLOGS (Sept. 16, 2011 5:00 
AM), http:/ /biogs.la weekly .com/westcoastsound/2011/09 / 
prosthetic_records_also_pullin.php. 
96. Spotify Forum, GETSATISFACTION, http://getsatisfaction.com/spotify/ 
topics/does_the_artists_i_listen_to_get.:._paid (last visited Nov. 24, 
2011). 
221 
JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & THE INTERNET · VOL. 4 · N 0. 1 · 2012 
Saving the Spotify Revolution 
likely.85 As music listeners increasingly substitute streaming music for 
mp3 purchases, independent artists are left with the choice of 
remaining on the service and earning pennies or abandoning the 
services and potentially earning nil on recorded music. 86 Many artists 
have chosen the latter, leaving Spotify in hopes of finding other ways 
to monetize their music.87 Similarly, once-loyal customers have begun 
defecting from the service, disturbed by its treatment of the artists 
they love. Ironically, Spotify has managed to alienate the very people 
whose interests they claim to advocate--the same people on whom 
they rely for success. Without the buy-in of musicians, Spotify 
cannot realize its vision of providing "[a]ll the music, all the time, "88 
nor can it expect to attract avid music fans, who care about artist 
compensation. 
A. The Dark Side of Spotify 
1. Conflict of Interest with Artists 
From their monopoly over CD sales to their litigious battle 
against file sharing, the major record labels have a long history of 
trying to maintain a chokehold on music distribution. Not much has 
changed with the emergence of streaming music, as the major labels 
have an ownership stake in Spotify.89 A search of Sweden's 
corporation records database confirmed that both the major labels 
and the Merlin Network purchased about 183 of Spotify- worth 
$250 million at that time90-for a little less than $10,000.91 This has 
two powerful implications. 
First, equity means a seat at Spotify's board of directors' table. 
With a reputation for maximizing profits at the expense of artists, the 
major labels are hardly a musician's first choice for a director of 
Spotify. Second, the major labels, as copyright holders and 
shareholders, earn money from Spotify from two sources: 1) royalties, 
which are shared with artists; and 2) profits, which are not shared 
85. See infra Part II.A.iii. 






See infra Part II.B. 
What Can Spotify Do?, SPOTIFY, http://www.spotify.com/us/about/ 
features/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2012). 
Helienne Lindvall, Behind the Music: The Real Reason Why the Major 
Labels Love Spotify, THE GUARDIAN MUSIC BLOG (Aug. 17, 2009, 10:03 
AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/music/musicblog/2009/aug/17 /major-
labels-spotify: 
Glenn Peoples, Is Spotify Really Worth 1 Billion?, BILLBOARD (Fe?· ~2, 
2011), http://www.billboard.biz/bbbiz/industry /digital-and-mob1le/1s-
spotify-really-worth-l-billion-l 005043612 .story. 
Lindvall, supra note 88. 
220 
JouRNALoFLAw, TECHNOLOGY&THElNTERNET · VoL. 4 ·No. l · 2012 
Saving the Spotify Revolution 
with artists.92 This means that the labels' interests were not aligned 
with artists' interests during negotiations with Spotify. In other 
words, the labels may have been happy with lower-than-fair royalty 
rates, since they stood to earn money from Spotify through other 
avenues. 
For both of these reasons, Spotify has an inescapable conflict of 
interest with artists, one that has not gone unnoticed by the 
independent music community. For instance, independent label 
Prosthetic Records announced in mid-September that it would be· 
pulling its artists· from Spotify because "[i]ndependent labels are 
getting the short end of the stick. "93 Prosthetic noted that since the 
major labels have an equity stake in Spotify, artists at major labels 
are effectively treated with preference over independent artists. 94 
According to Prosthetic, "Spotify as it's currently configured will 'kill 
... smaller bands that are already struggling to make ends meet. "'95 
2. Lack of Financial Transparency 
. Suspicious of Spotify for its involvement with the major labels, 
artists and fans have expressed a desire to know where the money 
goes once it passes into Spotify's hands. Nonetheless, Spotify has 
resisted releasing information about how it allocates revenue. Spotify 
gives canned, general responses to inquiries about its financial flows, 
saying that it "ha[s] deals with all the major record labels and 
recording rights institutions to ensure that artists receive 
compensation for being part of Spotify, "96 or that it, "respect[s] 
creativity and believe[s] in fairly compensating artists for their work. 
[Spotify has] cleared the rights to use the music you'll listen to in 
92. See Pascal-Emmanuel Gobry, How Spotify's Business Works, BUSINESS 
INSIDER (Oct. 12, 2011), http://articles.businessinsider.com/2011-10-
12 /research/30269526_1_spotify-revenues-cost (detailing how Spotify 
makes its money and describing how it must pay royalties to record 
labels). 
93. Vince Neilstein, Breaking: Prosthetic Records Will Pull Artists From 




95. Jason Roche, Prosthetic Records is the Third L.A. Metal Label to Pull 
Their Catalog Off of Spotify, LAWEEKLY BLOGS (Sept. 16, 2011 5:00 
AM), http://blogs.laweekly.com/westcoastsound/2011/09/ 
prosthetic_records_also_pullin.php. 
96. Spo_tify Forum, GETSATISFACTION, http://getsatisfaction.com/spotify / 
top1cs/does_the_artists_i_listen_to_get.:_paid (last visited Nov. 24, 
2011). 
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Spotify. "97 As one band put it, "we have no idea how they carve up 
the money. They only disclose this information to the [m}ajor record 
labels. "98 
Spotify's silence about its revenue allocation raises several 
questions. The first is: how big is the copyright royalty pie? It is 
unclear whether and to what extent both of Spotify's revenue 
sources-advertising and subscriptions-contribute to royalty 
payments. How much does Spotify allocate to royalties, and how 
much disappears into the proverbial 'black box'-that is, money not 
attributed to royalties which remains with Spotify's investors 
(including the major labels)?99 
The second question is: how does Spotify divide up the copyright 
royalty pie among intermediaries? Since mechanical royalties are 
fixed by statute, Harry Fox Agency's slice of the pie is fairly 
ascertainable.100 How Spotify doles out the rest of the pie is difficult 
to determine, for its contracts with the PROs, labels, and artist 
aggregators hide behind non-disclosure agreements.101 Without more 
information, independent artists are left to suspect they are treated 
less favorably than major label artists. Some commentators believe 
that major label artists "get much better streaming rates than the 
[independent artists]. "102 Others have surmised that major label 
97. Sasha Muller, The Sinister Side of Spotify, PC PRO BLOGS (Mar. 5, 
2010), http://www.pcpro.co.uk/blogs/2010/03/05/the-sinister-side-of-
spotify. 
98. Mike Masnick, How Much Does a Band Make From Various Music 




99. Lindvall, supra note 88. ("For artists who 'signed up to a label' there's a 
tangible risk that revenue which comes from a possible sale of shares by 
the label would end up in the proverbial 'blackbox' (non-attributable 
revenue that remains with the label). There's growing concern about 
this in the artist management community and, a few weeks ago, Bob 
Dylan decided to pull his back catalogue from UK streaming services. 
The only Dylan albums currently on Spotify are Bob Dylan's 60s Live, 
A 30th Anniversary Concert Celebration, a tribute compilation and a 
few tracks that are featured on movie soundtracks."). 
100. 17 u.s.c. § 115 (2010). 
101. Ben Rooney, Spotify Will Find U.S. Tough to Crack, WALL ST.J. TECH-
EUROPE BLOG (Jul. 14, 2011, 3:45 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/tech-
europe/2011/07 /14/spotify-will-find-u-s-tough-to-crack. 
102. Lindvall, supra note 88; see Should You Put Your Music On Spotify?, 
LIVE UNSIGNED BLOG (Jul. 12, 2011, 1:57 PM), 
http://www.liveunsigned.com/blog/2011/07 /should-you-put-your-music-
on-spotify (asserting that "the major labels had to get a higher rate to 
get them on board with Spotify"). 
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artists get a cut of advertising revenue, whereas independent artists 
do not. 103 As one artist put it, if the major labels did, in fact, "use 
their large catalogs as leverage to earn higher rates per stream . . . 
[t]his moves the music industry in the opposite direction of the past 
decade, possibly to a much worse, unbalanced landscape. "104 
Each of these questions gives artists and music fans more reason 
to wonder whether artists are getting a fair cut of Spotify's revenue. 105 
3. Paltry Payouts to Independent Artists 
Layers of non-disclosure agreements may disguise the mechanics 
behind Spotify's financial flow, but thanks to the Internet and a 
growing multitude of outspoken and disgruntled artists, it is no longer 
a secret that artists earn miniscule royalties from Spotify's service. 
This fact amplifies concern about Spotify's lack of transparency, 
reinforcing the fear that money may be disappearing into the 'black 
box'. 
A number of artists began opening their accounting books to the 
Internet community to reveal what they earned on Spotify. One 
independent band, Marwood, made its actual account statements 
from CD Baby available to the publfo, which showed a per-stream 
rate of $0.0008.106 Financial reports from another band, Only Seven 
Left, revealed another troubling fact: not only were its songs earning 
royalties worth peanuts, but the same song earned substantially 
different royalty rates during the same day. 107 For instance, on 
103. See Zoe Keating, Zoe Keating on Spotify, Fairness to Indie Artists & 
Music's Niche Economy, HYPEBOT (Sept. 2011), 
http://www.hypebot.com/hypebot/2011/09/zoe-keating-on-spotify-
fairness-to-indie-artists-musics-niche-economy.html ("[T]he word on the 
street is that majors receive profits from Spotify's advertising revenue 
and indies do not."); see also Aubin, Another Label Leaves Spotify, 
PUNKNEWS.ORG (Nov. 14, 2011, 6:00 PM), http://www.punknews.org/ 
article/45174 (asserting that indie artists "only get a 503 share of ad 
revenue on a pro-rata basis which has been relatively inconsequential"). 
104. Cameron Mizell, Spotify From a Musician's Perspective, 
MUSICIANWAGES.COM (Sept. 27, 2011), http://www.musicianwages.com/ 
the-working-musician/ spotify-from-a-musicians-perspective. · 
105. A third, related question-though independent of Spotify's revenue 
allocation-is how do intermediaries in turn pay artists and songwriters? 
Although artists are aware of the terms of their contracts, listeners are 
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Spotify."97 As one band put it, "we have no idea how they carve up 
the money. They only disclose this information to the [m}ajor record 
labels. "98 
Spotify's silence about its revenue allocation raises several 
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artists get a cut of advertising revenue, whereas independent artists 
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January 15 2011 its song "Safe & Sound" earned $0.0011 per stream 
' ' h 108 y •t th in one instance and $0.0106 per stream in anot er. e ano er 
band, Uniform Notion, divulged its earnings to the blogosphere, but 
added some context by calculating what it stood to earn from one 
Spotify listener: 109 
With Spotify, we'll get 0.003 EUR per play. 
If you listen to the album all the way through, we'll get 0.029 
EUR. 
If you listen to the album 10 times on Spotify, we'll get 0.29 
EUR 
If you listen to it a hundred times, we'll get 2.94 EUR 
If you listen to the album I,000 times (once a day for 3 years!) 
we'll get 29.47 EUR!110 -
To highlight the absurdity of Spotify's royalties, the website 
Information is Beautiful released a chart entitled "Selling Out," which 
depicted how much artists earn online from various sou:ces. m The 
chart showed how many units-be it CDs, mp3s, or music streams-
the artist would have to sell per month to make minimum wage in the 
United States.112 Where a signed artist would need to sell about 4,000 
CDs or 12,000 mp3 downloads to r~~ch minimum wage,_ t~~3 same 
artist would need to deliver over 4 million streams on Spotify. Just 
five days after the Information is Beautiful chart_ hit. the Internet, 
British newspaper The Guardian released an article m early 2010 
entitled "Sell 1 m records today and you'll earn a half-sucked 
gobstopper covered in fluff. "114 The article reported that superstar 
108. Id. 
109. How Much Does a Band Make From Various Music Platforms?, 
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Lady Gaga's payout from 1 million Spotify streams of her hit song 
"Poker Face" was a mere $167.00. 115 $167.00 may be a little better 
than a gobstopper covered in fluff, but if that is the royalty payout 
~or an interna~ional pop star like Lady Gaga, how could an 
mdependent artrnt expect to make any money from Spotify's service? 
4. "Climate of Suspicion": Artists Left in the Dark 
Spotify's lack of transparency about its financial flows, combined 
with its involvement with the major record labels and its paltry 
royalty rates, creates what Patrick Rackrow, chairman of the British 
Academy of Songwriters, Composers and Authors ("BASCA"), calls a 
"climate of suspicion" within the music community: 
[T]here is no clear trail that can be established so that the 
songwriter can trace back what they ought to have got. These 
things are behind a blanket of secrecy, and that is extremely 
worrying. The danger is that these deals all become so secret 
that the mist that descends creates uncertainty, creates fear. 
That allied to the fact that the sums being paid through are 
very small creates a climate of suspicion. I think that harms 
Spotify, it harms the writers' perception of Spotify and this is a 
service that they want to support. 116 
As Rackrow suggests, Spotify's behavior degrades its reputation 
among artists and writers, threatening to convert would-be advocates 
into abandoners. 
B. Turning Allies Into Enemies: Artists f3 Listeners Defecting From 
Spotify 
With a blanket of secrecy over their eyes, musicians must make 
an ill-informed, seemingly lose-lose choice. Should artists stay on 
Spotify and collect miniscule royalties from their music? Or, should 
they leave the service, forgoing Spotify revenue altogether? Spotify 
advocates argue that artists who drop out of Spotify are "totally 
missing the point," because they forgo the benefits of the service in: 
exchange for nothing. 117 While Spotify royalties may be worth 
peanuts, "no royalties . . . seems worse than little royalties . . . "118 
Furthermore, if a band leaves Spotify, it is more difficult for 
115. Id. 
116. Ian Youngs, Songwriters Condemn Spotify, BBC (Apr. 12, 2010), 
http://www.bbc.eo.uk/6music/news/20100412_spotify.shtml. 
117. Mi~e Masnick, Labels Dropping Out of Spotify Are Totally Missing the 
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potential new fans to discover them-and no band earns money in 
obscurity. 119 
But many artists fervently believe that when it comes to Spotify, 
nothing is far better than something, even when that 'nothing' is 
illegal downloading. By leading listeners to believe that artists are 
being fairly compensated, Spotify's system threatens to devalue music 
even more than unauthorized file sharing. According to N oiseTrade 
founder and recording artist Derek Webb, this is because "when you 
get music illegally it's at least implicit in the transaction that what 
you're doing is potentially harmful to the artist. But with Spotify, 
your conscience is clear because you're either enduring ads or paying 
to use the service and access the music. "120 Another artist agreed that 
it is Spotify's measly streaming rates, not music "theft," that 
threatens to devalue music: "I honestly think a better model IS 
invalidated illegal downloading, rather than validated streaming. 
Might sound weird. But I'd rather you steal from me than insult me 
by saying that my music is worth nothing. "121 
Although Spotify is often characterized as the ultimate 
promotional tool, many artists feel that they're better off giving their 
music away. An artist who uploads its music to a BitTorrent can 
include a customized promotional PDF in the zip folder. 122 
Additionally, an artist who puts his music on a pay-what-you-want 
site like NoiseTrade gets his fans' email addresses. 123 As one 
commentator eloquently put it, "[i]f that "something" is essentially 
peanuts, and if an artist's involvement in such a system helps 
maintain, or even expand, an exploitative power structure, in the 
long-term it would be better for artists to forgo the peanuts. "124 
Concerned music fans have also been defecting from Spotify on 
account of its treatment of artists. In writing about how a prominent 
119. Id. 
120. Derek Webb, Giving it Away: How Free Music Makes More Than 
Sense, DEREKWEBB.TUMBLR.COM (Dec. 1, 2011), 
http://derekwebb.tumblr.com/post/13503899950/giving-it-away-how-
free-music-makes-more-than-sense. 
121. Thurston, Comment to Spotify, File-Sharing and Incomplete Statistics, 
NEW MUSIC STRATEGIES (Nov. 20, 2011, 8:51 AM), 
http://newmusicstrategies.com/2011/10/12/spotify-file-sharing-
incomplete-statistics. 
122. Spotify, File-Sharing And Incomplete Statistics, NEW MUSIC STRATEG~ES 
(Oct. 12, 2011), http://newmusicstrategies.com/2011/10/12/spotify-file-
sharing-incomplete-statistics. 
123. Webb, supra note 119. 
124. The (Pretty Damn) Weak Arguments for Spotify, MUSIC Is MED. BLOG 
(Sept. 26, 2011), http://mimtunes.wordpress.com/2011/09/26/the-
pretty-damn-weak-arguments-for-spotify. 
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~ndependent label had recently chosen to leave Spotify, one music 
mdustry blogger decried Spotify's lack of transparency from a 
consumer's point of view: 
Until we know how much Spotify is making from ad income, 
how much they're making from premium subscriptions (as 
opposed to free memberships) and the total of how much 
they're paying out in royalties - in addition to their operating 
cost / overhead - it's impossible for anyone to say whether 
their royalty rates are fair or not. If Spotify doesn't have much 
money coming in, well, then their payout rates could in fact be 
quite fair; on the flip side, if they're making bank on ads and 
pocketing the profit, not cool. I've said it before and I'll say it 
again, because it's very important: Spotify needs to be 
forthcoming with 100%, no-bullshit transparency. It needs to 
happen now. Or else it'll be clear they're hiding something.125 
This blogger's rant echoes the common-sense intuition of many 
Spotify critics: if they aren't telling us anything, then they must be 
hiding something. Many such critics have shut down their Spotify 
accounts to protest what they believe is an exploitation of artists.126 
In short, Spotify is hardly fulfilling its prophecy of revolutionizing 
music for artists. To the contrary, by driving away the very 
constituencies on whom it depends-artists and listeners-Spotify 
may be laying the foundation of a self-fulfilling prophecy: its own 
demise. 
Ill. SAVING THE SPOTIFY REVOLUTION: RECALIBRATING THE 
POWER IMBALANCE IN DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 
A. The Reason: A Revolution Worth Saving 
As things stand, artists are well-justified in distrusting the digital 
jukebox Spotify. Could Spotify nonetheless be beneficial to artists 
and the listening public under different conditions? · The streaming 
music business model serves copyright's constitutional goals of 
promoting the creation and dissemination of works. Further, as 
streaming music gains traction through network effects, services like 
Spotify could start to make sense out of cents through the 
multiplication effect. With potential to benefit artists, the Spotify 
revolution is a revolution worth saving. 
Streaming music serves copyright's underlying constitutional goals 
of incentivizing the creation of new works and promoting their 
125. Neilstein, supra note 92. 
126. E.g., Joe Minihane, Why I'm Quitting Spotify, JOEMINIHANE.COM (Jul. 
27, 2011), http:/ /joeminihane.com/2011/07 /27 /why-i3E2380399m-
quitting-spotify. 
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streaming music gains traction through network effects, services like 
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dissemination to the public. The Progress Clause authorizes Congress 
to enact copyright laws to promote "Progress."127 Part of "Progress" 
is the creation of works themselves, which have the power to expand 
society's knowledge base and influence culture.128 "Progress" also 
embodies dissemination, for true societal progress cannot occur unless 
the public is exposed to the works. 129 As a low-cost, decentralized 
distribution model, streaming mus,ic promotes the creation of new 
works by giving even fledgling artists an opportunity to deliver their 
music to a worldwide audience. 130 This incentivizes the creation of an 
abundant, diverse selection of music, giving listeners a broad range of 
choices.131 Further, through reducing distribution costs, file sharing 
promotes dissemination, giving everyone in society, regardless of 
socioeconomic status, access to music. 132 
While fractions of a penny don't add up to much when only a 
fraction of music listeners are plugged into Spotify, simple 
mathematics show that once Spotify's membership base grows, the 
numbers could start to make sense, even with royalties set at current 
rates. An artist's monthly revenue on Spotify can be simplistically 
modeled by the following equation, R = s x n, where R is equal to 
monthly revenue, s is equal to the· per stream royalty rate, and n is 
equal to the number of streams the band receives that month. 
Imagine a hypothetical independent band comprised of four 
members, whose goal is for each band member to make minimum 
wage-$1,160 per month, per member, or $4,640 per month total.133 
Assume the band expects for half of its revenue to come from ticket 
sales, traditional CD sales, and merchandise sales, and the other half 
to come from Spotify royalties. And assume a per-stream royalty rate 
127. U.S. CONST. art. 1, §8, cl. 8. 
128. See LYDIA LOREN & JOSEPH MILLER, INTELLECTUAL PROP.: CASES & 
MATERIALS, at 312 (describing how creation fits into "Progress" and 
stating "copyright law is meant to provide an incentive . . . for 
creation"). 
129. See id; Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 244 (2003) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (discussing how thC1 First Amendment encourages 
dissemination and the importance of not depriving the public of 
information). 




133. Minimum Wage, Dep't of Labor, http://www.dol.gov/whd/. 
minimumwage.htm#.UHN5shXA-Sp (last visited Oct. 8, 2012) ("The 
federal minimum wage is $7.25 per hour ... " When multiplied by four, 
representing the four complete weeks in a month, the result is a 
minimum wage per month of $1,160). 
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of $0.0008/stream, as suggested by the data discussed above. 134 The 
band's monthly revenue could be modeled as follows: $2,320 
$0.0008 x n. For the band to reach its monthly goal of $2,320 on 
Spotify, the band must achieve 2,900,000 streams per month. The 
band could achieve this level of success if 2,900,000 unique users listen 
to their music once, if 580,000 fans listen to their music five times, if 
290,000 fans listen to their music ten times, or some other 
combination. This is no small goal, and certainly seems unrealistic 
under current conditions: Spotify's user base barely exceeds 3 million 
users, and it is questionable that many users would stream a band ten 
or more times a month. However, if Spotify's user base grows, this 
goal could be attainable. 
Skeptics may look to the size of Spotify's current user base and its 
poor financial performance as evidence that there is not enough 
demand for a streaming music service to survive. What this fails to 
recognize, however, is that new technology services like Spotify often 
take years to catch on because they rely on network effects- the 
phenomenon in which the value of the service rises exponentially as 
the number of connected users increases. 135 With a combination of 
patience and innovation, network effects can cause a service to spread 
like wildfire once it reaches a critical point. 136 
A modern-day example of network effects is Facebook. If 
Face book had just one user, it would be meaningless . But if that one 
user recruited 99 friends to join Facebook, the website would increase 
in utility because each user would have 99 other people with whom to 
interact. Compared to the time of its inception, current-day 
Facebook is infinitely more useful with its 750 million users-almost 
half of the world's Internet-connected population.137 With those 
numbers, Facebook has transcended its original yearbook concept to 
become more like a comprehensive world directory where you can find 
anyone. 
Examining the growth pattern of Facebook helps demonstrate 
how a service with network effects gains traction. In its inaugural 
year of 2004, Facebook had almost 1 million users. 138 At that time, 
the service was limited to Ivy League networks and had minimal 
134. See supra, Part II.A.iii. 
135. Global Swap Shops, THE ECONOMIST (Jan. 28, 2010), available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/15350972?story_id=15350972. 
136. Id. 
137. Internet Users in the World, INTERNET WORLD STATS, 
http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm (last visited Nov. 24, 
2011). 
138. Timeline, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?timeline 
(last visited Nov. 24, 2011). 
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dissemination to the public. The Progress Clause authorizes Congress 
to enact copyright laws to promote "Progress."127 Part of "Progress" 
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127. U.S. CONST. art. 1, §8, cl. 8. 
128. See LYDIA LOREN & JOSEPH MILLER, INTELLECTUAL PROP.: CASES & 
MATERIALS, at 312 (describing how creation fits into "Progress" and 
stating "copyright law is meant to provide an incentive . . . for 
creation"). 
129. See id; Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 244 (2003) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (discussing how the First Amendment encourages 
dissemination and the importance of not depriving the public of 
information). 
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of $0.0008/stream, as suggested by the data discussed above.134 The 
band's monthly revenue could be modeled as follows: $2,320 
$0.0008 x n. For the band to reach its monthly goal of $2,320 on 
Spotify, the band must achieve 2,900,000 streams per month. The 
band could achieve this level of success if 2,900,000 unique users listen 
to their music once, if 580,000 fans listen to their music five times if 
' 290,000 fans listen to their music ten times, or some other 
combination. This is no small goal, and certainly seems unrealistic 
under current conditions: Spotify's user base barely exceeds 3 million 
users, and it is questionable that many users would stream a band ten 
or more times a month. However, if Spotify's user base grows, this 
goal could be attainable. 
Skeptics may look to the size of Spotify's current user base and its 
poor financial performance as evidence that there is not enough 
demand for a streaming music service to survive. What this fails to 
recognize, however, is that new technology services like Spotify often 
take years to catch on because they rely on network effects- the 
phenomenon in which the value of the service rises exponentially as 
the number of connected users increases. 135 With a combination of 
patience and innovation, network effects can cause a service to spread 
like wildfire once it reaches a critical point.136 
A modern-day example of network effects is Facebook. If 
Face book had just one user, it would be meaningless . But if that one 
user recruited 99 friends to join Facebook, the website would increase 
in utility because each user would have 99 other people with whom to 
interact. Compared to the time of its inception, current-day 
Facebook is infinitely more useful with its 750 million users-almost 
half of the world's Internet-connected population.137 With those 
numbers, Facebook has transcended its original yearbook concept to 
become more like a comprehensive world directory where you can find 
anyone. 
Examining the growth pattern of Facebook helps demonstrate 
how a service with network effects gains traction. In its inaugural 
year of 2004, Facebook had almost 1 million users. 138 At that time, 
the service was limited to Ivy League networks and had minimal 
134. See supra, Part II.A.iii. 
135. Global Swap Shops, THE ECONOMIST (Jan. 28, 2010), available at 
http://www.economist.com/node/15350972?story_id=15350972. 
136. Id. 
137. Internet Users in the World, INTERNET WORLD STATS, 
http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm (last visited Nov. 24, 
2011). 
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(last visited Nov. 24, 2011). 
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features, such as user profiles with "walls. "139 Facebook's user base 
grew to 5.5 million in 2005, when the service expanded to high schools 
and added a photo application.140 In 2006, Facebook expanded to 
work networks and added the news feed feature, growing its user base 
to 12 million. 141 Facebook reached the 50 million user mark in 2007 as 
it began to establish an international presence and launched its 
mobile application.142 The service doubled to 100 million users in 
2008, the year when Facebook chat launched. 143 By 2009 the service 
had over 350 million users and a robust database of applications. 144 In 
2010, the service had 500 million users,145 and in 2011, Facebook had 
reached 750 million users. indeed a critical mass compared to the 
world's population of 6.7 billion people.146 As this brief history shows, 
Facebook did not reach ubiquity overnight. Yet once the service 
began to catch on, its user base and revenue grew exponentially. This 
is because social media is a market with network effects: the more 
users that enter the system, the more beneficial it is to other would-be 
users to enter .147 
Like Facebook, Spotify is a service with network effects. Its 
sharing feature is useful between two friends, but has the potential to 
revolutionize how society shares music as the service achieves further 
penetration. The more people that join Spotify, the more popular the 
service will become, and therefore, the more desirable it will be to 
potential users to subscribe. And fittingly, Spotify's integration with 
Facebook-the premier social networking service, thanks to network 
effects-will help Spotify permeate the online world much more 
quickly than it could otherwise. In fact, after Facebook integrated 
streaming music providers into its news ticker, Face book users shared 
their songs 1.5 billion times in a six-week period.148 
Notwithstanding these network effects, Spotify's growth won't 
explode without a critical mass of users. Some sources believe that 









147. Global Swap Shops, supra note 134. 
148. Brian Anthony Hernandez, Facebook Users Shared Their Songs 1.5 
Billion Times in 6 Weeks, MASHABLE (Nov. 8, 2011), 
http://mashable.com/2011/11/08/music-apps-facebook-open-graph. 
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the U.S. market. 149 Assuming it has not yet reached this turning 
point, Spotify may need to continue innovating and improving its 
service to attract more users. 15° Furthermore, to offer a product that 
is truly a substitute for music ownership, Spotify will need to continue · 
growing its music library-a goal that it cannot achieve so long as it 
continues driving away artists. 
With the potential to be a viable money-making channel for 
artists, and supporting copyright's constitutional goals, the Spotify 
revolution is one worth saving. 
B. The Problem: Spotify's Insulation From Pressures to Change 
To determine the best course for saving the Spotify revolution, it 
is worth considering why natural market and political forces have not 
compelled Spotify to change already. As it turns out, Spotify is 
insulated from many of the pressures that companies often endure. 
Sheltered from the winds of change, Spotify has been able to sustain 
its practices of non-transparency and poor compensation of artists. 
One such source of pressure is the law: legislative and regulatory 
enactments could, in theory, require Spotify to make more disclosures 
or pay higher royalty rates. As a privately held company, Spotify is 
not required to disclose information about its finances to the public or 
to the Securities & Exchange Commission, and therefore remains free 
149. Eliot Van Buskirk, Spotify Usage Explodes: The Social Network Effect, 
EVOLVER.FM (Sept. 30, 2011, 12:26 PM), 
http://evolver.fm/2011/09/30/spotify-usage-explodes-the-social-
networ k-effect. 
150. Critics have already pointed out a number of areas for improvement. 
Classical music listeners in particular have been disappointed with 
Spotify's lack of gapless playback between tracks: instead of playing an 
album with the amount of silence between tracks that the artist 
intended, Spotify inserts an additional second or two of silence, 
disrupting the flow of an otherwise seamless playback. See Kirk 
McElhearn, Why Spotify Sucks for Classical Music, KIRKVILLE (Jul. 15, 
2011), http://www.mcelhearn.com/why-spotify-sucks-for-classical-music. 
Others have criticized Spotify's search engine as "lackluster." See Zosia 
Boczanowski, Spotify: Not Out of the Woods Yet, MUSIC Bus. J. (Oct. 
2011), http://www.thembj.org/2011/10/spotify-not-out-of-the-woods-
yet. Some users would like to see new features, including: a parallel 
browser-based application rather than requiring users to download a 
desktop application, analytics tools to help artists understand Spotify's 
effectiveness as a promotional tool, and better filters on the mobile 
application, to name just a few, See Id.; Data, or Lack Thereof, 
UNIFORM MOTION (Sept. 27, 2011), http://uniformmotion.tumblr.com/ 
post/10726176237 /data-or-lack-thereof; MisterReally, Posting of As an 
iPhone User I Want to Filter My Playlists With Ease, S:POTIFY FORUM 
(Nov. 19, 2011, 11:23 AM), http://www.spotify-forum.com/ 
viewtopic. php ?f=9&t=2045&sid=60254b5dc5962b63bf8199ed6806eb4d. 
For more suggestions from users on improving Spotify, see generally 
Ideas/Improvements, SPOTIFY FORUM, http://www.spotify-
forum.com/viewforum.php?f=9 (last visited Nov. 29, 2011). 
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features, such as user profiles with "walls. "139 Facebook's user base 
grew to 5.5 million in 2005, when the service expanded to high schools 
and added a photo application.140 In 2006, Facebook expanded to 
work networks and added the news feed feature, growing its user base 
to 12 million. 141 Facebook reached the 50 million user mark in 2007 as 
it began to establish an international presence and launched its 
mobile application. 142 The service doubled to 100 million users in 
2008, the year when Facebook chat launched.143 By 2009 the service 
had over 350 million users and a robust database of applications.144 In 
2010, the service had 500 million users,145 and in 2011, Facebook had 
reached 750 million users. indeed a critical mass compared to the 
world's population of 6.7 billion people.146 As this brief history shows, 
Facebook did not reach ubiquity overnight. Yet once the service 
began to catch on, its user base and revenue grew exponentially. This 
is because social media is a market with network effects: the more 
users that enter the system, the more beneficial it is to other would-be 
users to enter .147 
Like Facebook, Spotify is a service with network effects. Its 
sharing feature is useful between two friends, but has the potential to 
revolutionize how society shares music as the service achieves further 
penetration. The more people that join Spotify, the more popular the 
service will become, and therefore, the more desirable it will be to 
potential users to subscribe. And fittingly, Spotify's integration with 
Facebook-the premier social networking service, thanks to network 
effects-will help Spotify permeate the online world much more 
quickly than it could otherwise. In fact, after Facebook integrated 
streaming music providers into its news ticker, Face book users shared 
their songs 1.5 billion times in a six-week period.148 
Notwithstanding these network effects, Spotify's growth won't 
explode without a critical mass of users. Some sources believe that 









147. Global Swap Shops, supra note 134. 
148. Brian Anthony Hernandez, Facebook Users Shared Their Songs 1.5 
Billion Times in 6 Weeks, MASHABLE (Nov. 8, 2011), 
http://mashable.com/2011/11/08/music-apps-facebook-open-graph. 
230 
JouRNALOFLAw, TECHNOLOGY&THEINTERNET · VoL.4 · No.1·2012 
Saving the Spotify Revolution 
the U.S. market. 149 Assuming it has not yet reached this turning 
point, Spotify may need to continue innovating and improving its 
service to attract more users. 15° Furthermore, to offer a product that 
is truly a substitute for music ownership, Spotify will need to continue 
growing its music library-a goal that it cannot achieve so long as it 
continues driving away artists. 
With the potential to be a viable money-making channel for 
artists, and supporting copyright's constitutional goals, the Spotify 
revolution is one worth saving. 
B. The Problem: Spotify 's Insulation From Pressures to Change 
To determine the best course for saving the Spotify revolution, it 
is worth considering why natural market and political forces have not 
compelled Spotify to change already. As it turns out, Spotify is 
insulated from many of the pressures that companies often endure. 
Sheltered from the winds of change, Spotify has been able to sustain 
its practices of non-transparency and poor compensation of artists. 
One such source of pressure is the law: legislative and regulatory 
enactments could, in theory, require Spotify to make more disclosures 
or pay higher royalty rates. As a privately held company, Spotify is 
not required to disclose information about its finances to the public or 
to the Securities & Exchange Commission, and therefore remains free 
149. Eliot Van Buskirk, Spotify Usage Explodes: The Social Network Effect, 
EVOLVER.FM (Sept. 30, 2011, 12:26 PM), 
http://evolver.fm/2011/09/30/spotify-usage-explodes-the-social-
network-effect. 
150. Critics have already pointed out a number of areas for improvement. 
Classical music listeners in particular have been disappointed with 
Spotify's lack of gapless playback between tracks: instead of playing an 
album with the amount of silence between tracks that the artist 
intended, Spotify inserts an additional second or two of silence, 
disrupting the flow of an otherwise seamless playback. See Kirk 
McElhearn, Why Spotify Sucks for Classical Music, KIRKVILLE (Jul. 15, 
2011), http://www.mcelhearn.com/why-spotify-sucks-for-classical-music. 
Others have criticized Spotify's search engine as "lackluster." See Zosia 
Boczanowski, Spotify: Not Out of the Woods Yet, MUSIC Bus. J. (Oct. 
2011), http://www.thembj.org/2011/10/spotify-not-out-of-the-woods-
yet. Some users would like to see new features, including: a parallel 
browser-based application rather than requiring users to download a 
desktop application, analytics tools to help artists understand Spotify's 
effectiveness as a promotional tool, and better filters on the mobile 
application, to name just a few. See Id.; Data, or Lack Thereof, 
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to be non-transparent about its financial flows. 151 Since it only 
streams licensed music at technically bargained-for rates, Spotify is in 
compliance with copyright law. 152 Moreover, no regulations directly 
address streaming music. 153 The current legal framework, therefore, 
does not require Spotify to change. 
A second potential source of pressure is rights holders, as Spotify 
depends upon the cooperation of artists and labels in building its 
music library. In theory, rights holders could use their veto power 
under copyright law to pressure Spotify into more favorable terms; 
the problem is that Spotify already has the buy-in-both figuratively 
and literally-of the major labels, which collectively own a monopoly 
share of sound recordings. 154 With the vast majority of the world's 
music locked down under contract, Spotify is well-poised to attract 
millions of subscribers, as it has managed to do. 155 Hardly threatened 
when independent artists leave the service, Spotify has the bargaining 
power to offer adhesion-style licenses to independent labels on a take-
it-or-leave-it basis. 
A third potential source of pressure is consumers, as some 
listeners care where the money goes when they pay for music. 156 If the 
money makes it into the pockets of the artists themselves, listeners 
may be more likely to pay up. 157 One would think, then, that more 
music fans would be boycotting Spotify. Yet, as Webb has observed, 
Spotify may have consumers duped. 158 Spotify gives listeners a false 
151. See, e.g., WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER, 1 FLETCHER CYC. CORP. § 56 
("Numerous laws and regulations, especially securities laws and 
regulations, apply to publicly-held corporations but not to privately-held 
corporations."). 
152.' See 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (2002). 
153. See generally Patents, Trademarks, and Copyrights, 37 C.F.R. §§ 1.1 -
90.3 (2012). 
154. See 2010 Quarter 1 Marketshare for Major Music Labels, ROUTENOTE 
BLOG (Mar. 26, 2010), http://routenote.com/blog/2010-quarter-1-
marketshare-for-major-music-labels (reporting that major labels had 
over 803 combined market share in 2010). 
155. Glenn Peoples, Business Matters: Spotify Rising, Now at 10.2 Million 
Monthly Average Users, BILLBOARD (Dec. 14, 2011), 
http:/ /www.billboard.biz/bbbiz/industry /digital-and-mobile/business-
matters-spotify-rising-now-at-10-1005678832.story. 
156. E.g., majestic12, Posting of Does The Artist I Listen To Get Paid?, 
GET SATISFACTION, http://getsatisfaction.com/spotify /topics/ 
does the artists_i_listen_to_get_paid (last visited Dec. 13, 2011) 
(askj;g Spotify, "[A]m i [sic] just paying spotify [sic] or is some of that 
money going back to the artists?"). 
157. Id. 
158. Webb, supra note 120. 
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impression that artists are reaping substantial financial benefits from 
the service. So long as consumers harbor this belief, they likely will 
not be a source of pressure for Spotify. 
A fourth kind of pressure one might expect Spotify to encounter-
and perhaps, the most significant in saving the Spotify revolution-is 
competitive pressure. Broader competition would increase innovation 
in streaming music, for more firms means more creative thinkers. 
Moreover, competitive pressures would likely give Spotify an incentive 
to be fairer and more transparent, as transparency itself could become 
a point of differentiation, one used to attract listeners concerned 
about the plight of artists. 159 Yet, Spotify faces very little direct 
competition at all, for an insurmountable barrier to entry stands in 
the way: the major labels, who control the majority of sound 
recording rights. The touchstone of streaming music is access over 
ownership, so the attractiveness of a streaming service depends largely 
on the breadth of its catalog. 160 To be successful, a service must 
license a seemingly endless library of music. At the very least, a 
streaming service needs the major label catalogs, which account for 
the vast majority of recorded music. Of course, the labels' near-
oligopoly gives them a formidable collective bargaining position, 
particularly since copyright law grants the owners of sound recordings 
an absolute right to negotiate-or to refuse to negotiate-with 
interactive services like Spotify. 161 This means that the major labels 
are effectively the gatekeepers of streaming music, deciding who will 
enter the market and on what terms. 
The gatekeepers have been very guarded as to whom they will let 
pass through the doors. To date, Spotify has only a handful of direct 
competitors, such as MOG, Rdio, and Rhapsody. At least two of 
these, MOG and Rdio, are part-owned by the major labels, meaning 
that they are plagued by the same problems as Spotify. 162 This state 
of affairs strongly suggests that the major labels will not license a 
streaming service unless they wield control over its vis10n. 
Undergirded by the constitutional purpose of progress, copyright law 
159. Helman, supra note 21, at 97-98 (2009) ("Transforming the power 
balance can also increase the transparency in distribution of royalties to 
artists. The accounting system utilized by the labels is unconventional, 
to put it mildly. The key according to which royalties are distributed 
among artists is often in the exclusive possession of the labels, and the 
artists' power to object to the figures is often impractical."). 
160. For a discussion of several popular streaming services and their 
respective music catalogs, see Alexandra Fletcher, Assessing 10 Music-
Streaming Services, PASTE (AUG. 1, 2011, 11:00 AM), 
http://www.pastemagazine.com/blogs/lists/2011/08/10-best-music-
streaming-services.html. 
161. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (2002). 
162. See Helman supra note 20. 
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to be non-transparent about its financial flows. 151 Since it only 
streams licensed music at technically bargained-for rates, Spotify is in 
compliance with copyright law. 152 Moreover, no regulations directly 
address streaming music. 153 The current legal framework, therefore, 
does not require Spotify to change. 
A second potential source of pressure is rights holders, as Spotify 
depends upon the cooperation of artists and labels in building its 
music library. In theory, rights holders could use their veto power 
under copyright law to pressure Spotify into more favorable terms; 
the problem is that Spotify already has the buy-in-both figuratively 
and literally-of the major labels, which collectively own a monopoly 
share of sound recordings. 154 With the vast majority of the world's 
music locked down under contract, Spotify is well-poised to attract 
millions of subscribers, as it has managed to do. 155 Hardly threatened 
when independent artists leave the service, Spotify has the bargaining 
power to offer adhesion-style licenses to independent labels on a take-
it-or-leave-it basis. 
A third potential source of pressure is consumers, as some 
listeners care where the money goes when they pay for music. 156 If the 
money makes it into the pockets of the artists themselves, listeners 
may be more likely to pay up. 157 One would think, then, that more 
music fans would be boycotting Spotify. Yet, as Webb has observed, 
Spotify may have consumers duped. 158 Spotify gives listeners a false 
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impression that artists are reaping substantial financial benefits from 
the service. So long as consumers harbor this belief, they likely will 
not be a source of pressure for Spotify. 
A fourth kind of pressure one might expect Spotify to encounter-
and perhaps, the most significant in saving the Spotify revolution-is 
competitive pressure. Broader competition would increase innovation 
in streaming music, for more firms means more creative thinkers. 
Moreover, competitive pressures would likely give Spotify an incentive 
to be fairer and more transparent, as transparency itself could become 
a point of differentiation, one used to attract listeners concerned 
about the plight of artists. 159 Yet, Spotify faces very little direct 
competition at all, for an insurmountable barrier to entry stands in 
the way: the major labels, who control the majority of sound 
recording rights. The touchstone of streaming music is access over 
ownership, so the attractiveness of a streaming service depends largely 
on the breadth of its catalog. 160 To be successful, a service must 
license a seemingly endless library of music. At the very least, a 
streaming service needs the major label catalogs, which account for 
the vast majority of recorded music. Of course, the labels' near-
oligopoly gives them a formidable collective bargaining position, 
particularly since copyright law grants the owners of sound recordings 
an absolute right to negotiate-or to refuse to negotiate-with 
interactive services like Spotify. 161 This means that the major labels 
are effectively the gatekeepers of streaming music, deciding who will 
enter the market and on what terms. 
The gatekeepers have been very guarded as to whom they will let 
pass through the doors. To date, Spotify has only a handful of direct 
competitors, such as MOG, Rdio, and Rhapsody. At least two of 
these, MOG and Rdio, are part-owned by the major labels, meaning 
that they are plagued by the same problems as Spotify. 162 This state 
of affairs strongly suggests that the major labels will not license a 
streaming service unless they wield control over its vis10n. 
U ndergirded by the constitutional purpose of progress, copyright law 
159. Helman, supra note 21, at 97-98 (2009) ("Transforming the power 
balance can also increase the transparency in distribution of royalties to 
artists. The accounting system utilized by the labels is unconventional, 
to put it mildly. The key according to which royalties are distributed 
among artists is often in the exclusive possession of the labels, and the 
artists' power to object to the figures is often impractical."). 
160. For a discussion of several popular streaming services and their 
respective music catalogs, see Alexandra Fletcher, Assessing 10 Music-
Streaming Services, PASTE (AUG. 1, 2011, 11:00 AM), 
http://www.pastemagazine.com/blogs/lists/2011/08/10-best-music-
streaming-services.html. 
161. See 17 U.S.C. § 106(6) (2002). 
162. See Helman supra note 20. 
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should not enable goliath rights holders like the major labels to 
leverage their market position to stifle the distribution of all musical 
works. Would-be entrants to the streaming music market should be 
able to access the major label catalogs at a price lower than their 
souls. 
·So long as Spotify remains numb to external pressures-
particularly, competitive pressures-it is unlikely it will change its 
ways. 
C. The Solution: Applying Competitive Pressure Through Compulsory 
Licensing 
The best avenue for saving the Spotify revolution is creating a 
competitive marketplace, one that the major labels cannot control by 
leveraging their copyright portfolios. Enabling non-label-controlled 
competitors to emerge will pressure Spotify to consider being more 
transparent with artists.163 Greater transparency will require Spotify 
to be fair in its dealings with artists. With the blanket of secrecy 
swept away, artists will have greater trust in Spotify as a tool that 
can revolutionize music, not just in general, but for the music makers 
themselves. 
The great wall to entry, as discussed earlier, is the combination of 
the labels' market power and holdout right. 164 While antitrust 
enforcement could, in theory, be a tool to target the major record 
labels' market power, it would be very difficult to develop a viable 
antitrust claim without stronger evidence of collusive anticompetitive 
behavior. 165 A cleaner solution is to curb the major record labels' 
holdout right by making sound recording licenses compulsory for 
interactive services. Although copyright law has distinguished 
between interactive and non-interactive services since the inception of 
the sound recording right, 166 the distinction is not well-justified in 
light of its underlying legislative history. 
Sound recordings were not protected under federal law until 1972, 
when Congress amended the Copyright Act of 1909 with the Sound 
Recordings Act of 1971.167 Passed in reaction to phonorecord. piracy, 
163. See id. ("Transforming the power balance can also increase ~he 
transparency in distribution of royalties to artists. The accountmg 
system utilized by the labels is unconventional, to put it mildly. The key 
according to which royalties are distributed among artists is often in the 
exclusivepossession of the labels, and the artists' power to object to the 
figures is often impractical."). 
164. See supra Part IV.A. 
165. Srivastava, supra note 35, at 446; see Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 
(2004) (prohibiting agreements that unreasonably restrain trade). 
166. See 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2010). 
167. Pun. L. No. 92-140, 85 STAT. 391 (1971) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.) (Act effective Feb. 15, 1972). 
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the Act conferred upon sound recordings the exclusive rights of 
reproduction and distribution-but not public performance. 168 The 
Ac~'s drafters contemplated including a public performance right, but 
ultimately declined to include it in favor of the broadcaster lobby.169 
As digital technologies advanced and proliferated, the performance 
right for sound recordings came back to the discussion table. 170 The 
Copyright Office noted in a report that "[s]atellite and digital 
technologies make possible the celestial J·ukebox music on demand 
' ' and pay-per-listen services," and that "[s]ound recording authors and 
proprietors are harmed by the lack of a performance right in their 
works."171 Legislative discussion on the issue ensued,172 and in 1995, 
Congress enacted the Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings 
Act ("DPRA"), which granted sound recording rights holders the 
exclusive right "to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of 
a digital audio transmission. "173 
As briefly mentioned in Part I, 174 the Act differentiates between 
interactive and non-interactive services: whereas non-interactive 
services are eligible for a compulsory license with rates set by statute, 
interactive services are not eligible for the compulsory license, and 
must negotiate directly with rights holders. 175 Non-interactive services 
include Internet radio providers like Pandora; interactive services 
include on-demand providers like Spotify. 176 The legislative history 
indicates that Congress distinguished between the two categories of 
providers out of a perception that "[i]nteractive services, which allow 
listeners to receive sound recordings 'on-demand', pose the greatest 
threat to traditional record sales. "177 Thus, Congress felt "in order to 
provide a comparable ability to control distribution of their works 
' copyright owners of sound recordings must have the right to negotiate 
168. Rebecca F. Martin, The Digital Performance Right in the Sound 
Recordings Act of 1995: Can It Protect U.S. Sound Recording 
Copyright Owners in A Global Market?, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 




172. Digital Performing Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, 17 U.S.C. §§ 
106 (2002). 
173. 17 u.s.c. § 106. 
174. See supra Part LC. 
175. 17 u.s.c. § 115 (2010). 
176. See id. 
177. S.REP. No. 104-128, at 24 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 356, 
371. 
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should not enable goliath rights holders like the major labels to 
leverage their market position to stifle the distribution of all musical 
works. Would-be entrants to the streaming music market should be 
able to access the major label catalogs at a price lower than their 
souls. 
·So long as Spotify remains numb to external pressures-
particularly, competitive pressures-it is unlikely it will change its 
ways. 
C. The Solution: Applying Competitive Pressure Through Compulsory 
Licensing 
The best avenue for saving the Spotify revolution is creating a 
competitive marketplace, one that the major labels cannot control by 
leveraging their copyright portfolios. Enabling non-label-controlled 
competitors to emerge will pressure Spotify to consider being more 
transparent with artists. 163 Greater transparency will require Spotify 
to be fair in its dealings with artists. With the blanket of secrecy 
swept away, artists will have greater trust in Spotify as a tool that 
can revolutionize music, not just in general, but for the music makers 
themselves. 
The great wall to entry, as discussed earlier, is the combination of 
the labels' market power and holdout right. 164 While antitrust 
enforcement could, in theory, be a tool to target the major record 
labels' market power, it would be very difficult to develop a viable 
antitrust claim without stronger evidence of collusive anticompetitive 
behavior.165 A cleaner solution is to curb the major record labels' 
holdout right by making sound recording licenses compulsory for 
interactive services. Although copyright law has distinguished 
between interactive and non-interactive services since the inception of 
the sound recording right, 166 the distinction is not well-justified in 
light of its underlying legislative history. 
Sound recordings were not protected under federal law until 1972, 
when Congress amended the Copyright Act of 1909 with the Sound 
Recordings Act of 1971.167 Passed in reaction to phonorecord piracy, 
163. See id. ("Transforming the power balance can also increase the 
transparency in distribution of royalties to artists. The accounting 
system utilized by the labels is unconventional, to put it mildly. The key 
according to which royalties are distributed among artists is often in the 
exclusive possession of the labels, and the artists' power to object to the 
figures is often impractical."). 
164. See supra Part N.A. 
165. Srivastava, supra note 35, at 446; see Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 
(2004) (prohibiting agreements that unreasonably restrain trade). 
166. See 17 U.S.C. § 115 (2010). 
167. PUB. L. No. 92-140, 85 STAT. 391 (1971) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.) (Act effective Feb. 15, 1972). 
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the Act conferred upon sound recordings the exclusive rights of 
reproduction and distribution-but not public performance. 168 The 
Ac~'s drafters contemplated including a public performance right, but 
ultimately declined to include it in favor of the broadcaster lobby.169 
As digital technologies advanced and proliferated, the performance 
right for sound recordings came back to the discussion table. 170 The 
Copyright Office noted in a report that "[s]atellite and digital 
technologies make possible the celestial jukebox, music on demand, 
and pay-per-listen services," and that "[s]ound recording authors and 
proprietors are harmed by the lack of a performance right in their 
works. "171 Legislative discussion on the issue ensued, 172 and in 1995, 
Congress enacted the Digital Performance Right in Sound Recordings 
Act ("DPRA"), which granted sound recording rights holders the 
exclusive right "to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of 
a digital audio transmission. "173 
As briefly mentioned in Part I, 174 the Act differentiates between 
interactive and non-interactive services: whereas non-interactive 
services are eligible for a compulsory license with rates set by statute 
interactive services are not eligible for the compulsory license, and 
must negotiate directly with rights holders. 175 Non-interactive services 
include Internet radio providers like Pandora; interactive services 
include on-demand providers like Spotify. 176 The legislative history 
indicates that Congress distinguished between the two categories of 
providers out of a perception that "[i]nteractive services, which allow 
listeners to receive sound recordings 'on-demand', pose the greatest 
threat to traditional record sales. "177 Thus, Congress felt "in order to 
provide a comparable ability to control distribution of their works 
copyright owners of sound recordings must have the right to negotiat~ 
168. Rebecca F. Martin, The Digital Performance Right in the Sound 
Recordings Act of 1995: Can It Protect U.S. Sound Recording 
Copyright Owners in A Global Market?, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 




172. Digital Performing Right in Sound Recordings Act of 1995, 17 U.S.C. §§ 
106 (2002). 
173. 17 u.s.c. § 106. 
174. See supra Part LC. 
175. 17 u.s.c. § 115 (2010). 
176. See id. 
177. S.REP. No. 104-128, at 24 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 356, 
371. 
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the terms of licenses granted to interactive services. "178 Congress 
contemplated the idea that the DPRA could stand in the way of 
technological innovation. To this end, the legislative history makes 
clear that Congress intended "to provide copyright holders of sound 
recordings with the ability to control the distribution of their product 
by digital transmissions, without hampering the arrival of new 
technologies. "179 Ironically, the DPRA does exactly the opposite of 
what Congress intended with respect to streaming music. By stifling 
competiti?n in the streaming music market, the DPRA is hampering 
technological development and hindering artists' ability to effectively 
monetize their music. 
. Congress should modify the DPRA to make sound recording 
licenses compulsory for interactive services. Compulsory licensing 
would eliminate the labels' gatekeeping function, giving emerging 
streaming services access to the labels' catalogs. Moreover, the labels 
would no longer be able to leverage copyright ownership into 
streaming service ownership. By its current language, the DPRA is 
enabling majoritarian rights holders to prevent the use of sound 
recordings. Hampering instead of helping technological innovation in 
streaming music, the DPRA is exceeding the bounds of its legislative 
findings and working against its intended purpose of helping rights 
hol~ers monetize their digital recordings. Moreover, it is working 
a~ams~ the underlying constitutional goal of copyright, the 
d1ssemmation of creative works. 180 
VI. CONCLUSION 
. Spotify, and streaming music generally, have great potential to 
revolutionize music for listeners and artists. So long as the major 
labels possess the strong combination of oligopoly market share and 
holdout power, though, they will remain the gatekeepers of streaming 
music, demanding equity as the price . of admission. Further, 
streaming services like Spotify, insulated from competitive pressures, 
will likely continue in non-transparency and poor treatment of artists. 
Creating a compulsory licensing scheme for streaming music will 
foster the competitive climate necessary to compel the transparency 




180. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8 ("To promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."). 
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p AROL MET ADA TA: NEW BOILERPLATE 
MERGER CLAUSES AND THE 
ADMISSIBILITY OF MET ADAT A UNDER 
THE PAROL EVIDENCE RULE 
Thomas H. White* 
INTRODUCTION 
How does metadata1 interact with the parol evidence rule? The 
parol evidence rule often determines the success or failure of contract 
litigation by excluding evidence extrinsic to a final, integrated 
writing. Metadata is neither inherently intrinsic nor inherently 
extrinsic to the contract, but is, in effect, a new, liminal contract 
addendum which exists in nearly all modern contracts. How 
metadata is classified under the parol evidence rule is therefore a 
critical question for litigators and transactional attorneys. 
This paper briefly discusses the parol evidence rule. It then 
surveys the evolving role of metadata in law and discusses the 
arguments favoring and disfavoring admissibility of the metadata that 
accompanies modern contracts. The author then proposes a simple 
four-factor test for jurists and litigators to use when considering the 
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Metadata is commonly described as "data about data." Black's law 
dictionary defines metadata as "[s]econdary data that organize, manage, 
and facilitate the use and understanding of primary data." BLACK'S 
LAW DICTIONARY 1080 (9th ed. 2009). 
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